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Over the past quarter century, the concept of "adaptive
preferences" has played an important role in debates in law,
economics, and political philosophy. As Professor Jon Elster has
described this psychological phenomenon, "people tend to adjust their
aspirations to their possibilities."1 A number of prominent scholars
have argued that the existence of adaptive preferences "raises serious
problems for neoclassical economics and for unambivalent enthusiasm
for freedom of choice." 2 Because our current preferences are
constrained by the opportunities available to us, proponents of
adaptive preference theory contend, those preferences may not be the
best guide to what is in our interests; we may be unduly content with
unfair limitations on our opportunities. In a typical passage, Amartya
Sen describes the phenomenon this way:
The underdog learns to bear the burden so well that he or she overlooks the burden
itself. Discontent is replaced by acceptance, hopeless rebellion by conformist quiet,
and-most relevantly in the present context-suffering and anger by cheerful
endurance. As people learn to adjust to the existing horrors by the sheer necessity of
3
uneventful survival, the horrors look less terrible in the metric of utilities.

Thus, scholars have typically invoked the adaptive preferences
phenomenon as an argument that some preferences are not a proper
measure of justice and ought not guide policy. 4 Although some have
1.
JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 109 (3d ed.
1987).
2.
Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Pleafor Disaggregation,54 DUKE L.J. 385, 426 (2004).
For examples of scholars making similar points, see ELSTER, supra note 1, at 137; MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 111-66 (2000);
AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 14-15 (Oxford 1999) (1985); David Dolinko, The
Perils of Welfare Economics, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 351, 375-77 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal
Interference with PrivatePreferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1150 (1986).
3.
AMARTYA SEN, RESOURCES, VALUES, AND DEVELOPMENT 309 (1984). This general notion
clearly is related to the Marxian notion of "false consciousness," but it also draws on a more
liberal tradition. NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 114-15; see also JOHN STUART MILL,
UTILITARIANISM 10 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publishing 1979) (1861) ("It is better to be a
human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their
own side of the question.").
4.
See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 144 ("Even if the welfarist can show that people
desire liberty and justice, and even if some modification of the welfarist procedure could be
devised that reliably generated those goods ... it would not be clear that this is the right way to
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recognized in the abstract that nothing in the theory of adaptive
preferences requires preferences to be disregarded uniformly, 5 the
concept has nearly always been deployed as part of an argument for
6
disregarding revealed, expressed, or felt preferences.
Critics of adaptive preference theory have argued that the
7
theory lacks "both conceptual coherence and empirical grounding"
and that it is "undemocratic"8 because the true "argument for
satisfying preferences is that they are the individual's, whatever their
origin."9 We take a different tack. We agree with the theory's
proponents that adaptive preferences exist and that they raise
significant normative questions about the unreflective use of
preferences as a measure of justice or a basis for policy. But-and this
is a point to which proponents of adaptive preference theory have
given too little attention-identifying adaptive preferences is only the
beginning of the normative inquiry. Although the writings of the
theory's proponents sometimes suggest the contrary, we argue that
adaptive preferences ought not be automatically rejected (though
neither should they be accepted uncritically) as a measure of justice or
a basis for policy. Rather, the realization that particular preferences
are adaptive should induce a more searching normative inquiry into
whether those preferences ought to drive policy in particular contexts.
We illustrate this point by exploring one area in which we argue that,
far from ignoring adaptive preferences, the law should embrace and

justify our social interest in these goods."); SEN, supra note 2, at 14-15; SEN, supra note 3, at 309.
Elster distinguishes adaptive preferences (which result from "habituation and resignation") from
preferences developed through learning or conscious character planning. ELSTER, supra note 1,
at 112-14, 117-19. But other exponents of the adaptive preference theory use the term more
broadly. See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 136-38.
5.
See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 137 (arguing that "it is not at all clear that [Jon
Elster] should in such a sweeping way condemn adaptive preferences" because sometimes it
makes sense to encourage adaptation).
6.
For a rare instance of a law review article (albeit not one by scholars associated with the
adaptive preference theory) arguing that it might be inappropriate to disregard adaptive
preferences, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 605, 619-20 (2003) (arguing that if preferences adapt to a "postcrisis baseline" that restricts
liberty to protect against terror threats, that adaptation will be a good thing "if the precrisis
baseline represented a society underprepared for emergencies, in which law and institutions
were supplying too much liberty and not enough order").
7.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN CASE FOR CLASSICAL
LIBERALISM 146 (2003).

8.
Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Liberalism Versus Classical Liberalism, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 659, 672 (2004).
9.

Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 422 n.50 (2002).
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promote them. That area is what has been dubbed "the rapidly
bubbling cauldron" 10 of hedonic damages in tort.
Hedonic damages compensate for the lost enjoyment of life that
results from a tortious injury. Those damages are usually considered
to go beyond traditional pain and suffering or mental anguish
damages. Pain and suffering damages traditionally compensate "for
the physical discomfort and the emotional response to the sensation of
pain caused by the injury itself," and mental anguish damages
traditionally compensate for "shock, fright, emotional upset, and/or
humiliation" caused by the tort.1 ' Hedonic damages, by contrast,
compensate for limitations "on the injured person's ability to
participate in and derive pleasure from the normal activities of daily
life, or for the individual's inability to pursue his talents, recreational
12
interests, hobbies, or avocations."
A number of states recognize hedonic damages as a separate
category of recovery in tort and tort-like actions. 13 Others consider lost
enjoyment of life as an aspect of what are sometimes termed
4
"disability" damages-damages for physical or mental impairment.
Many other states permit juries to take account of lost enjoyment of
life in setting compensation for pain and suffering 15 or other forms of
general damages.' 6 In all these jurisdictions, 1 7 disability has loomed

10. Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic Damages: The Rapidly Bubbling
Cauldron, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1037, 1037-38 (2004). See generally Brendan I. Koerner, What's
Your Happiness Worth?, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 56 (discussing recent controversy over
hedonic damages).
11. Boan v. Blackwell, 541 S.E.2d 242, 244 (S.C. 2001).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Ky. 1997); Swiler v. Baker's Super
Mkt., Inc., 277 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Neb. 1979); McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375-77 (N.Y.
1989); Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prod. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 486 (Ohio 1992); Boan, 541
S.E.2d at 245.
14. See, e.g., Knight v. Lord, 648 N.E.2d 617, 623 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (noting that loss of
enjoyment of life is an aspect of disability damages, or damages for "loss of a normal life");
Anderson v. Neb. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 538 N.W. 2d 732, 740 (Neb. 1995) ("[L]oss of enjoyment of
life is not a separate category of damages but is an element or component of pain and suffering
and of disability."); Swiler, 277 N.W.2d at 700 ("Loss of enjoyment of life may, in a particular
case, flow from a disability and be simply a part thereof, and where the evidence supports it, may
be argued to the jury."); see Pamela J. Hermes, Loss of Enjoyment of Life-Duplication of
Damages Versus Full Compensation, 63 N.D. L. REV. 561, 577-80 (1987).
15. See, e.g., Canfield v. Sandock, 563 N.E.2d 1279, 1281-83 (Ind. 1990); Estate of Pearson
v. Interstate Power & Light Co., 700 N.W.2d 333, 347 (Iowa 2005); Gregory v. Carey, 791 P.2d
1329, 1336 (Kan. 1990); Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 102 P.3d 52, 64 (Nev. 2004) (noting the court's
agreement with "those jurisdictions permitting plaintiffs to seek compensation for hedonic loss as
an element of the general award for pain and suffering").
16. Canfield, 563 N.E.2d at 1282 (holding loss of enjoyment of life a proper part of general
compensation for personal injury).
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large. And the (explicit or implicit) view of disability is often one of
tragic dependency and helplessness. As we show in Part I below,
lawyers seeking hedonic damages emphasize their clients' new status
as compromised and damaged persons, and courts frequently uphold
jury verdicts awarding hedonic damages to individuals who have
experienced disabling injuries based on a view that disability-what
18
some courts refer to as the failure to be a "whole person"' necessarily limits one's enjoyment of life. This view is consonant with
a general societal understanding of disability as a tragedy and of
people with disabilities as natural objects of pity.
In this Article, we challenge that view. A rich psychological
literature demonstrates that disability does not inherently limit
enjoyment of life to the degree that these courts suggest. Rather,
people who experience disabling injuries tend to adapt to their
disabilities. To the extent that they experience continuing hedonic
loss, it is physical pain and loss of societal opportunities-not
anything inherent in the disability-that is the major contributor.
Unfortunately, people without disabilities have a difficult time
imagining that disability can do anything other than drastically
impair the enjoyment of life. Studies have consistently shown that
non-disabled people rate the quality of life with a disability as being
significantly lower than people with disabilities rate the quality of
their own lives. The extensive psychological literature on affective
forecasting-recently brought to a mass audience in Daniel Gilbert's
book Stumbling on Happiness' 9-demonstrates that this phenomenon
17. On the division of jurisdictions into these or similar groupings, see Ronald J. Mishkin,
Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as an Element of Damages, 73 DICK. L. REV. 639, 639 (1969);
Hermes, supra note 14, at 565; Carleton Robert Cramer, Note, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a
SeparateElement of Damages, 12 PAC. L.J. 965, 965-66 (1981); Gretchen L. Valentine, Comment,
Hedonic Damages: Emerging Issue in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Claims, 10 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 543, 577 (1990); Annotation, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Distinct Element or Factor in
Awarding Damages for Bodily Injury, 34 A.L.R. 4th 293 (1984). For a general discussion of the
case law both in states that allow a separate recovery for hedonic damages and in states that
allow recovery for hedonic damages as part of a broader noneconomic damages category, see
Susan Poser, Brian H. Bornstein, & E. Kiernan McGorty, Measuring Damages for Lost
Enjoyment of Life: The View From the Bench and the Jury Box, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 54-57
(2003).
18. E.g., Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 436 (W. Va. 1982).
19. DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 17 (2006). For a recent comprehensive
effort to assess the implications of the affective forecasting literature for the law, see Jeremy A.
Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problem of Affective Forecasting,80 IND. L.J. 155, 18485 (2005) (noting, though not developing the point, that the affective forecasting literature might
have implications for hedonic damages). For other recent examples of legal applications of the
affective forecasting literature, see Chris Guthrie, Risk Realization, Emotion, and Policy Making,
69 MO. L. REV. 1039, 1040-44 (2004); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character:A
Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 116-19 (2004). The recent
proposals for "asymmetric" or "libertarian" paternalism also respond to a significant extent to
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is no fluke. People simply do a poor job of predicting how they will feel
in new life circumstances. People without disabilities may expect that
a disabling injury will be tragic, but people who have such injuries
20
tend not to experience them that way.
To be sure, the views of people with disabilities about their own
quality of life are classic adaptive preferences. Accordingly, one might
suggest that the legal system should disregard those views. 21 But we
argue that the legal system goes wrong by so devaluing the experience
of people with disabilities. When courts award damages based on the
(non-disabled person's) view that disability is tragic, they distract
attention from the societal choices and stigmas that attach
disadvantage to disability; they also make it harder for people with
disabilities to make hedonic adjustments to their conditions. For
deterrence and compensation reasons, people who experience
disabling injuries should be able to recover for their physical pain; for
medical expenses and the cost of assistive technology and personal
assistance; and for the varied and costly accommodations that can
enable them to participate in our collective social life. But they should
not recover for any purported effect of disability on the enjoyment of
life.
We thus hope to contribute to the tort-law literature on hedonic
damages, as well as the wider literature on adaptive preferences. Our
intervention in these debates may also be regarded as an effort at
what Jerry Kang has called "behavioral realism," an interdisciplinary
collaboration that seeks "to deepen our understanding of human
behavior generally and [the mechanics of intergroup inequality]

problems of affective forecasting. See generally Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George
Loewenstein, Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral
Economics and the Case for 'Asymmetric Paternalism",151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1211-12 (2003)
('Recent research in behavioral economics has identified a variety of decision-making errors that
may expand the scope of paternalistic regulation."); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler,
LibertarianPaternalismIs Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1168 (2003) ("[Rlesearch
by psychologists and economists over the past three decades has raised questions about the
rationality of many judgments and decision that individuals make."). Edward McCaffery, Daniel
Kahneman, and Matthew Spitzer discuss some of the possible implications of adaptive
preferences theory for tort law in a more general way. See Edward J. McCaffery, Daniel J.
Kahneman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and
Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341, 1388-1403 (1995).

20. For ease of expression, we speak here in generalities about the basic tendencies of the
two groups; the views of individuals within each group are obviously heterogeneous. We discuss
that point below. See infra Part 1II.D.-E.
21. See JOHN MCKIE, PETER SINGER, HELGA KUHSE & JEFF RICHARDSON, THE ALLOCATION
OF HEALTH CARE RESOURCES: AN ETHICAL EVALUATION OF THE 'QALY' APPROACH 34 (1998)

(arguing that hedonic adaptation by people with disabilities should not be used in assessing their
quality of life).
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specifically, with an eye toward practical solutions."22 Our argument
proceeds as follows. In Part I, we show that lawyers presenting
hedonic damages cases and courts hearing those cases have treated
disability as inherently and tragically limiting the ability to enjoy life.
In Part II, we review the extensive evidence, developed by
psychologists and rehabilitation professionals, that people with
disabilities tend not to believe that their disabilities limit the ability to
enjoy life, but that people without disabilities have a much more
pessimistic view. Courts that award hedonic damages for disabling
injuries thus tend to act based on the views of most people without
disabilities, rather than on the views of most people with them.
Finally, in Part III, we develop in detail the normative and policy
implications, adopting what we believe are the valid insights of the
disability rights movement, which has long rejected pity as a basis of
public policy and pressed for societal changes rather than individual
cure or adaptation. With these as our normative commitments, we
argue that courts should not award hedonic damages based on
disability.
Our argument might seem, at first blush, to push a tort reform
agenda that prefers defendants' balance sheets to plaintiffs' bodies.
We do not agree with that prioritization and do not believe our
proffered reform serves those ends. Although we would erase one type
of damages, we are not interested in decreasing the bottom line of tort
awards. The tort system should, we believe, award compensatory
damages fully sufficient to enable tort plaintiffs with disabling
injuries to fund often costly accommodations to enable their
participation in the community. This may well be more rather than
less than is typically awarded under current doctrine.
Finally, we should note at the outset the limits of our
argument. The hedonic damages in which we are interested constitute
compensation for what some call the "shrunken pleasure" of living
with a disability, compared to the plaintiffs prior physical or mental
state. We are not dealing, at least not here and not directly, with two
related but distinct topics: "disability damages" that are not based on
the effect of disability on life's enjoyment, 23 and hedonic damages for
the complete loss of the ability to experience life (because of death or
coma, for example). 24 The former class of damages may implicate some
22. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1591-92 (2005).
23. As we have noted, disability damages are sometimes awarded for hedonic harm. See
cases cited supra note 14. Our argument applies in full to that class of disability damages.
24. On hedonic damages in cases arising out of deadly accidents, see, e.g., Andrew Jay
McClurg, It's a Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 66
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 60 (1990); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U.
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of the same normative issues we highlight with regard to hedonic
damages, but because it does not implicate the problem of hedonic
adaptation we do not discuss that class further. With respect to the
latter, hedonic damages in wrongful death cases or cases of coma or
vegetative state serve the function of placing a significant value on the
deprivation of all of life's experiences. 25 Because the plaintiffs or
decedents cannot perceive the awards, those cases are more about
deterrence than compensation. 26 More important for this project, they
do not relate to any adaptive preferences of their victims, who do not
have the ability to sustain any preferences at all.
I. DISABILITY AND HEDONIC DAMAGES PRACTICE
Our goal in this Part is largely descriptive. We show that when
lawyers seek, and courts award, hedonic damages, they often treat
disability as something that inherently (or nearly so) impairs not only
plaintiffs' physical or mental activity, but also their enjoyment of life.
In Section A, we examine how plaintiffs' lawyers themselves advise
their colleagues to argue for hedonic damages in cases involving
disabling injuries. In Section B, we examine the discourse in courts
that have upheld hedonic damages awards in such cases. This
description sets the stage for our discussion in Part II of the
psychological research, which shows that people with disabilities in
fact do not tend to believe that their disabilities limit their life's
enjoyment in the ways lawyers and courts suggest.
A. The Practicesof Plaintiffs' Lawyers
In personal injury cases, hedonic damages can be an important
component of plaintiffs' claims. Materials written by and for plaintiffs'
lawyers demonstrate that counsel in such cases aim to arouse jurors'
pity by emphasizing a great distance between "normal" and disabled
life. Lawyers advise their peers to paint a picture of injury as

CHI. L. REV. 537, 545 (2005) (noting that five states permit recovery for hedonic loss in wrongful
death actions). On hedonic damages when the plaintiff has been rendered unable to experience
anything, see, e.g., Eyoma v. Falco, 589 A.2d 653, 662 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (allowing
recovery for lost enjoyment of life by plaintiff in a vegetative state); McDougald v. Garber, 536
N.E.2d 372, 373 (N.Y. 1989) (holding some degree of cognitive awareness as prerequisite to
recovery of damages for loss of enjoyment of life).
25. It is possible that hedonic damages in such cases are compensatory to the victim's
families. But that has been neither the doctrinal justification nor the measure of damages.
26. We have no quarrel with that function of hedonic damages, although their deterrent
effect should not be overstated. See Margo Schlanger, Second Best Damage Action Deterrence, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 517, 530-31 (2006).
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permanent disability accompanied inevitably by debilitation and
27
dependence (and-over and over again-hygienic difficulties).
A few examples will suffice to give the basic flavor of these
materials. The first is a sample closing argument in a case in which
the plaintiff with impaired vision in one eye lost the vision in the other
eye due to the alleged medical malpractice of the defendant. (The
references to a computer are intended to shore up the jury's
responsibility for deriving a dollar figure without expert assistance):
You have to consider past and future loss of life's pleasures. You have to award Paul for
that. You heard the testimony. A computer doesn't know what it's like to want to play a
game of cards with the guys down the block. A computer doesn't know what it's like to
have someone say, "Pop Pop, do you want to catch a ball?"... Imagine you need to go for
a haircut or to go visit your relatives, and to realize that you are a prisoner. You have to
ask your wife "will you drive me down for the haircut, will you wait outside for the
haircut, and when I'm done will you take me home" Or consider that this time of year
you want to do some Christmas shopping. You can't go to the mall. You can't go out and
take a walk around the neighborhood. You can't even buy a gift for someone because you
have to ask your wife to take you.
A computer doesn't know what it's like to be a man and you go to a wedding or you go to
a first communion or a bar mitzvah, and when you have to go to the bathroom you have
' 28
to say, "Will you take me, Karen?

A leading practitioners' treatise similarly advises lawyers
seeking hedonic damages for disabling injuries to turn the trial into a
maudlin spectacle that aims at demonstrating that the plaintiffs "life
has no dignity":
Have [the plaintiffs husband] describe their family, to which he will readily respond
that his spouse was the center of a typical American family. They did all of the normal
things that any family would do, together. As a family, they went out to dinner or the
movies. They enjoyed planning and taking vacations. His wife always took the
photographs and made the family scrapbook. She was an excellent homemaker and
cook, but more importantly a wonderful mother. She lived to do things with their
daughter. She had always dreamed of having a daughter so that she could do the same
things with her daughter that her mother had done with her. She got her wish and her
daughter was her joy. The husband explains that his wife and daughter had an excellent
relationship. They talked about everything. They were each other's best friend.
You then call the daughter, who, with courage, describes her relationship with her
mother. Her testimony, although brief, less than 15 minutes, is poignant.
Unsurprisingly, there is no cross-examination. The daughter tells the jury how happy
her mother was the week before the injury, that she was on school break and they could
decorate her room together. Her mother was a problem solver, willing to help with
school issues and willing to step in and intervene or advise on problems with friends.
Together they worked on jigsaw puzzles, played cards, made candy, went shopping,
enjoyed lunch and through everything, they talked. This was a "girl thing' between a

27. On the disability rights movement's rejection of this portrayal, and its implications for
hedonic damages, see infra text accompanying notes 148-160.
28. Thomas Duffy, A Plaintiffs'Attorney's Perspective, in MEDICAL-LEGAL ASPECTS OF PAIN
AND SUFFERING 483, 485-96 (Patricia Iyer ed., 2003).
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mother and daughter, two women. They basically did everything together. These are the
relationships and activity patterns that the injured mother had established as her
normal life prior to injury.
This testimony will stand in marked contrast to the medical care providers who will
testify that plaintiff is incapable of doing any of the things her husband and daughter
described, and is unable to perform any of the normal, everyday activities of life. She
can't comb her hair or bathe herself. She must ring a bell to relieve her bladder. A
woman who loved to cook is now fed through a gastrostomy tube. All of the simple
mundane aspects of daily life, that we take for granted and that comprise
our normal
29
lives, she is no longer capable of performing. Her life has no dignity.

Understandably enough, the entire presentation of evidenceindeed, the entire development of evidence-is aimed at consolidating
this image and rejecting any more sanguine assessment of the
plaintiffs life prospects. The same treatise suggests, for example:
If a physician describes a "moderate" loss, have him or her explain it on a scale of mild,
moderate, and severe. Stress that the physician is someone who deals with disabled
persons every day. It is moderate compared to the few who have severe injuries, but
devastating in contrast to the individual who has no disabilities. The individual with a
limp may be consoled by the person confined to a wheelchair, but is still frustrated, selfconscious and feels inadequate when observing
the overwhelming majority of people
30
who walk without any impediment whatsoever.

Practitioners stress that plaintiffs themselves can often
undermine their own cases. One lawyer writes, "Plaintiffs also tend to
understate their condition in the [day-in-a-life] diary with notations of
'good' or 'not bad today.' This is somewhat ironic considering that
clients are often making these notations while confined to a
wheelchair or bed. '3 1 Likewise, the same treatise chapter quoted above
counsels:
In developing the testimony you will ultimately present on the issue of noneconomic
damages, you may find that the plaintiff is not the best, and certainly not the only,
witness who should discuss these damages. After all, the plaintiff lives with his or her
32
injuries on a daily basis and has learned to compensate for his or her limitations.

Thus the treatise suggests that lawyers should override their clients'
own claims of adjustment, coping, and adaptation.
For this reason and to avoid the plaintiff seeming like a
whiner, plaintiffs' lawyers frequently advise that the plaintiff not even
attend the trial. Instead, says one experienced trial lawyer, plaintiffs
counsel should inform the jury:

29. Philip H. Corboy & Susan J. Schwartz, Pain and Suffering and Non-Economic
Damages, in ATLA's LITIGATING TORT CLAIMS § 24:13 (Roxanne Barton Conlin & Gregory S.
Cusimano eds., 2003).
30. Id. § 24.17.
31. Duffy, supra note 28, at 487.
32. Corboy & Schwartz, supra note 29, § 24.10.
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"With the court's permission and pursuant to the recommendation of the treating
physician, John Doe will not be present in the courtroom except when providing
testimony, if at all." This lends apparent judicial approval to the plaintiffs absence. It
injuries are so incapacitating that the rigors of a
also subtly declares that the plaintiffs
33
trial are beyond plaintiffs abilities.

The point is that plaintiffs' counsel litigate personal injury
cases to emphasize to both the defendant (for settlement) and the jury
that plaintiffs' injuries are permanently disabling and devastating in
their effect on plaintiffs' dignity and quality of life. That is, plaintiffs'
attorneys attempt to show that plaintiffs' injuries have caused
plaintiffs inevitably sharp contraction in their personal agency and
activity, and, consequently, in their enjoyment of life.
B. The Judicial Discourse
The same frame characterizes judicial decision-making in these
cases. Consider a 1967 California case, in which the plaintiff, a
conductor-brakeman for a railroad, had both legs severed. The court
sustained a large damages award on two alternative bases. The
award, the court said, was fully supportable as economic damages (for
lost wages, rehabilitation costs, and the like). But in addition, it was
reasonable in light of the plaintiffs hedonic damages:
At the time of respondent's injury he was 29.7 years of age. The fruitful and productive
years of his life were before him. In the accident he lost both legs high above the knees.
His right stump is only three and three-quarters inches in length, his left one four
inches. There was evidence that he will never be able to use functional artificial legs;
that he will be confined to a wheelchair for the remainder of his days; that he will
require personal assistance in the routine affairs of living, and will never be able to hold
gainful employment of a significant nature. In sum, so far as the expected pleasures and
satisfactions3 4of life are concerned he has become a mere spectator and is no longer a
participant.

In many cases upholding hedonic damages awards, judges
seem to have concluded explicitly that the mere fact of disability,
without more, necessarily limits life's enjoyment. In one early case,
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court upheld a damages award on the
ground that "[t]he total loss of the left hand by a boy 10 years of age
takes a great deal of usefulness and enjoyment out of his prospective
life. '35 Although the court stated that "[t]he loss of earning power is by
no means the extent of the injury,"36 it did not elaborate on how the
absence of a left hand deprived the plaintiffs life of "usefulness and

33.

WILLIAM A. BARTON, RECOVERING FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES 176 (2d ed. 1990).

34.
35.
36.

Henninger v. S. Pac. Co., 59 Cal. Rptr. 76, 84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
Haynes v. Waterville & Oakland St. Ry., 64 A. 614, 615 (Me. 1906).
Id.

756

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:3:745

enjoyment." 37 Similarly, in a 1925 case, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey affirmed a plaintiffs verdict, explaining without development:
"A shriveled hand and wrist is a mortification especially to a young
woman, such as Mrs. Haeussler was. She is entitled to compensation
for the mortification. Such an injury also deprives one of much of the
enjoyment of life." 38 In a far more recent case, in holding that hedonic
damages could be recovered as part of an award for permanent
impairment, the New Hampshire Supreme Judicial Court concluded
that the inability to engage in pleasurable activities "is the natural
result of the incapacity that an impairment award is designed to
compensate." 39 Hedonic damages thus were part and parcel of the
permanent impairment award, which "compensates the victim for the
inability to function as a 'whole person.' "40 Other courts have
similarly suggested that individuals with disabilities inevitably
experience hedonic loss because they can no longer "function as a
41
whole man."
The language of wholeness, which appears with some
regularity in the caselaw, 42 is a classic linguistic devaluation of life
with a disability; other similar signals-use of the words "normal" or
"crippled"-are common as well. Some cases, for example, characterize
hedonic damages as recovery of damages for "loss of a normal life"
attendant to disability. 43 Others use the language of normalcy in even
a more pointed way. A 1980 Wyoming case, explaining that disability
damages and hedonic damages are intertwined doctrinally, stated:
[We [previously] held that loss of mobility may be compensable even if it doesn't result
in loss of earnings because mobility "is the right to be a normal human being." This

37. Cf. King v. Britt, 148 S.E.2d 594, 598 (N.C. 1966) (ruling that the jury could "infer and
find that the permanent scar on appellant's forehead caused her to suffer mental pain" even
though the appellant "did not testify that she suffered any mental pain or anguish or
embarrassment or humiliation").
38. Haeussler v. Consol. Stone & Sand Co., 127 A. 602, 604 (N.J. 1925).
39. Bennett v. Lembo, 761 A.2d 494, 498 (N.H. 2000).
40. Id. (citation omitted).
41. E.g., Canfield v. Sandock, 563 N.E.2d 1279, 1282 (Ind. 1990); Flannery v. United States,
297 S.E.2d 433, 436, 438 (W. Va. 1982).
42. The language is characteristic not only of opinions, but also of lawyers' arguments. See
Gary Gober, Closing Argument: The Lawyer's CrowningAchievement, TRIAL, Apr. 1998, at 70, 75
(quoting the closing argument in a case about neck injury: "A year and a half ago, this man was a
whole person. He was 100 percent of a man, and he's lost that."); supra notes 39, 41.
43. Smith v. City of Evanston, 631 N.E.2d 1269, 1278 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); see Golden Eagle
Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 766-67 (Tex. 2003) (treating lost enjoyment of life as
equivalent to "the inability to have a normal life"); see also Paul E. Marth, Comment, Loss of
Enjoyment of Life-Should It Be a Compensable Element of Personal Injury Damages?, 11 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 459, 459 (1975) ("[T]he right to recover for the diminished capacity to enjoy life ...
encompass[es] such ideas as inconvenience, embarrassment, loss of pleasure and enjoyment of
life, and inability to engage in normal activities.").
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suggests that appellee's neck injury, which has caused him to curtail some of his
physical activities,4 4 should be compensable because it has deprived him of ordinary
human pleasures.

The word "crippled" also appears occasionally. For example, in
a 1967 case a federal district court upheld hedonic damages based on a
finding that the plaintiff, who had fractured two heel bones, could no
longer engage in "dancing, ice skating, walking through the nearby
woods or the Lake Michigan shore, family picnics, mushroom hunting,
and shopping." 45 The court added that the plaintiff "will no longer be
permitted to enjoy many of the things in life which it may well be said
'make life worth living.' He will always be crippled, and must suffer
the inconvenience and humiliation incident to such physical
46
condition."
Not all courts upholding hedonic damages awards have treated
disability as something that in and of itself limits the ability to enjoy
life. Some have instead identified specific pleasure-creating activities
in which the plaintiffs (like others with similar impairments) can no
longer engage. In one case, the court awarded hedonic damages to a
woman who experienced a severe leg fracture, based on evidence that
as a result of her injury she was "unable to leave her home without
constant supervision and assistance" and had "difficulty moving
around in her own home." 4 7 Another upheld hedonic damages awarded
a plaintiff who had lost some mobility in her arms because she had to
rearrange her kitchen "so she could reach items," she "has problems
eating, dressing, and brushing her hair," she "sleeps in a recliner," and
she "is tired by the evening and does not have the stamina she had
before." 48 Numerous other cases have upheld hedonic damages awards
49
based on similar showings.
44. Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 12 (Wyo. 1980) (citing Fox v. Fox, 296 P.2d 252, 262
(Wyo. 1956)).
45. Gowdy v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 733, 750 (W.D. Mich. 1967), rev'd on other
grounds, 412 F.2d 525, 535 (6th Cir. 1969) (holding that the defendant was not in fact negligent).
46. Gowdy, 271 F. Supp. at 750 (citation omitted).
47. Harnesk v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., No. 87-2328-Civ-DAVIS, 1991 WL 329584, at *2
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 1991).
48. Ford v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 760 So. 2d 478, 488 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
49. See, e.g., Nemmers v. United States, 681 F. Supp. 567, 575-76 (C.D. Ill. 1988) (awarding
hedonic damages to a child who, because of the defendant's negligence in prenatal medical
treatment, was born with mental retardation and cerebral palsy, and reasoning that the plaintiff
"will never be able to do most of the normal things of life: the first date, parenting children,
reading, debating the politics of the day, etc."; that the plaintiff "can see but not substantially
comprehend, and he can hear but not substantially understand"; and that "[t]here may be love
and affection in his life, but almost all of the developments to which a normal person is exposed
during his or her childhood and adulthood will pass him by"); Yosuf v. United States, 642 F.
Supp. 432, 439 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (awarding damages for lost enjoyment of life to plaintiff who,
because of an injury to his hand, was "unlikely" to "be able to pursue such things as tennis,
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Just as plaintiffs' lawyers maneuver to keep their clients'
adaptations from shrinking recovery, there is evidence that juries and
courts disregard evidence of hedonic adjustment that is presented.
Consider Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Anderson,50 a Texas case in
which a four-year-old boy had three toes taken off by a negligently
maintained escalator. 5 1 Included in the jury's $17 million award was
$1 million for future pain and mental anguish (remitted by the trial
judge to $308,394) and $6 million for past and future physical
impairment (remitted by the trial judge to $1.8 million).5 2 The court of
appeals reinstated the full $1 million in the future mental anguish
53
category, and upheld the $1.8 million for physical impairment. Of
course, the procedural question before the court of appeals was the
existence of sufficient evidence to uphold the jury verdict-not the
court's own view of that evidence. But the discussion demonstrates the
ways in which both juries and courts may assess the evidence with
weightlifting, basketball, or heavy household chores" in the future); Hendrix v. Stepanek, 771
N.E.2d 559, 568 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) ("[P]laintiff testified that before the accident she was very
active and enjoyed gardening, housework, camping, canoeing, and motorcycle riding but that
after the accident either she could not enjoy these activities at all or she was only able to enjoy
them much less frequently."); Payton v. City of New Orleans, 679 So. 2d 446, 452 (La. Ct. App.
1996) (upholding a general damages award to a plaintiff with severe leg and back pain as a
result of a knee injury: "After the injury, she was unable to pursue her hobbies, to play actively
with her children or to continue to work. She testified that emotional and sexual aspects of her
marriage likewise deteriorated. She continues to have pain and swelling, and the medical
experts testified that her condition is not expected to improve with time or further surgery.");
Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 97 (Mo. 1985) (inability to "enjoy a normal sexual
life or have children normally" and "destruction of her athletic lifestyle which will prevent her
from ever again playing tennis, skiing, running, jogging, playing softball, raquetball [sic], hiking,
backpacking and riding horses" relevant to lost enjoyment of life component of pain and
suffering); Lowe v. State, 599 N.Y.S.2d 639, 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (upholding damages
award to compensate individual whose left hand and forearm were severed for "inability to
perform certain day-to-day activities at all or to perform them as quickly as before, and inability
to participate in sports such as basketball, which claimant previously enjoyed"); Young v. Warr,
165 S.E.2d 797, 901 (S.C. 1969) (upholding an award of general damages, which included a
component for lost enjoyment of life, based on testimony that the plaintiff had lost control of his
bladder and bowel functions and 'lost all ability for sexual function"); Overstreet v. Shoney's,
Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 717 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) ("While wearing her eye shield, Ms. Overstreet
could not swim or wash her own hair, and she was forced to avoid heavy lifting and driving.");
Lawrence v. Town of Brighton, No. 02A01-9801-CV-00020, 1998 WL 749418, at *5-6 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Oct. 28, 1998) (upholding award of hedonic damages where plaintiff "could no longer raise
or care for his dogs," "was not able to cook or help his mother with normal household chores,"
"could not play with children as he had in the past," "could no longer engage in exercises such as
lifting weights, running, and jumping, could not help his brother with yard work or drive a car
to Memphis when he and his brother went shopping together," and "was forced to sleep in a
recliner").
50. Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Anderson, 78 S.W.3d 392 (Tex. App. 2001), vacated on
settlement, Docket No. 02-0426 (May 22, 2003).
51. See id. at 399.
52. See id. at 410-15.
53. See id. at 412-13.
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some skepticism about the ability of a plaintiff to overcome the
trauma of a new disability.
In Schindler the court of appeals began its discussion of the
future pain and mental anguish award by noting that,
notwithstanding his injury, the "evidence shows that Scooter is a
54
happy child who, at the time of trial, was active in many sports."
Nonetheless, the court said, Scooter did show some "concern[]" about
his foot (for example, wearing a sock to avoid seeing it, even when
swimming). 55 Even though his psychologist testified that he "will
continue to psychologically adjust to the loss of his toes and injury to
his foot in the future," 56 the court (and apparently the jury) gave more
weight to the evidence that "his self-esteem is based in large part on
his physical ability, and when he cannot compete athletically on the
level of his peers in the future, it will be very difficult for him."5 7
Moreover, the court reasoned that "by high-school age, the only sport
in which Scooter will be able to participate at a competitive level is
58
swimming."
Similarly, in reviewing the jury's award (after remittitur) of
$1.5 million for future "physical impairment, sometimes called loss of
enjoyment of life," the court quoted Scooter's own testimony that " 'I
can do all the things I used to do.' "59 But again, the court held the jury
entitled to give more weight to the concomitant testimony that
"running [would] be more difficult" in Scooter's future, "even [his]
walking will be affected," "he will have problems with standing for
long periods and with climbing," and might (if he eventually had to
have the other two toes amputated, as might occur) in the future have
to walk with "shortened steps" or suffer an " 'appreciable limp.' "60
Already, noted the court, he "limps when he is tired." 61 This evidence,
the court held, was sufficient to support $1.5 million in hedonic
damages, 62 even for a happy, athletic child.
These cases hardly represent the entirety of hedonic damages
practice. But they should suffice to show how disability and hedonic
damages interact. Lawyers argue that disability saps happiness; juries
award hedonic damages to plaintiffs who experience disabling

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 411.

at 411 n.7.
at 412.
at 413.
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injuries; and judges uphold those awards. All do so based on a view
that disability-either inherently or because it forecloses particular
pleasurable activities-limits the ability to enjoy life, by undermining
independence, dignity, and overall happiness. As we show in the next
Part, those decisions reflect the views of most non-disabled people
about the lives of people with disabilities. But they do not track the
views of most people with disabilities themselves.
II. DISABILITY AND HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY
The discussion in the preceding Part should demonstrate that
courts have upheld hedonic damages awards based on the view that
disability-even in the form of relatively minor physical
impairments-necessarily limits the ability to enjoy life. That view,
we contend, does not reflect how most people with disabilities
themselves feel. As we show in this Part, an extensive body of
research demonstrates that people who acquire disabilities tend not to
lose much enjoyment of life, at least after an initial transition period.
As the psychological literature on hedonic adaptation shows, people
have a tendency to maintain their happiness following adverse events
through a variety of psychological mechanisms. 63 Moreover, an
extensive body of research demonstrates that people without
disabilities tend to view the prospect of life with a disability as far less
enjoyable than people with disabilities themselves report their lives as
being. As the literature on affective forecasting demonstrates, people
are poor predictors of how they will feel in new and unfamiliar life
circumstances. 64 By requiring non-disabled jurors and judges to decide
whether plaintiffs' disabilities limit their ability to enjoy life, hedonic
damages practice all but guarantees that a pessimistic view of
disability will be translated into litigation practice, verdicts, and
doctrine.
This Part proceeds as follows. In Section A, relying on
literature from a variety of disciplines, we show that many individuals
with disabilities report that their conditions do not limit their ability
63.

For a good general overview of the hedonic adaptation literature, see Shane Frederick &

George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC

PSYCHOLOGY 302 (Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert Schwarz eds., 1999).
64. For good general overviews of the affective forecasting literature, see George
Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? PredictingFuture Feelings, in WELL-BEING,
supra note 63, at 85; Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting,35 ADVANCES
IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 345 (2003); see also Blumenthal, supra note 19, at 165-81. See
generally Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting Some Problems in the Forecasting
of FutureAffective States, in FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL COGNITION

178 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000).
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to enjoy life, or at least not significantly. In Section B, we show that
people without disabilities have a very different, and much more
negative, view about the impact of disability on an individual's quality
of life, and, importantly, that the litigation process is especially likely
to bring out that negative view. The decisions that uphold hedonic
damages for disability, though they depart from the views of most
people with disabilities, are therefore unsurprising.
A. The Views of People with Disabilities:Of Hedonic Adaptation
In a classic study published in 1978, Professor Philip Brickman
and his colleagues interviewed "lottery winners and accident victims"
to assess the degree to which major strokes of good or bad fortune
change a person's happiness. 65 They interviewed twenty-nine
individuals with quadriplegia or paraplegia, twenty-two lottery
winners, and twenty-two controls, and they asked the interviewees to
rate their general happiness and their current experience of mundane
everyday pleasures. 66 Although "lottery winners rated winning the
lottery as a highly positive event, and paraplegics rated their accident
as a highly negative event," 67 the lottery winners were nonetheless
less happy, and the accident victims happier, than the researchers had
anticipated. In particular, lottery winners and controls "were not
significantly different" in their self-reported happiness ratings; and
although accident victims did report that they "experienc[ed] their
present as less happy than controls," their happiness rating was "still
above the midpoint of the scale," and they "did not appear nearly as
unhappy as might have been expected." 68 In ratings of their experience
of mundane, everyday pleasure, there was no meaningful difference
69
between lottery winners, accident victims, and controls.
The Brickman study has become the "most famous article in
the psychological literature on well-being." 70 To be sure, it hardly
offered definitive proof that disability has no effect on the enjoyment

65.

See generally Philip Brickman, Dan Coates & Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Lottery Winners

and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917 (1978).

66.
67.
68.
69.
famous,

Id. at 918-19.
Id. at 920.
Id. at 920-21.
See id. at 921. For another classic study in the genre, though one that has not become as
see Paul Cameron, Donna Gnadinger Titus, John Kostin & Marilyn Kostin, The Life

Satisfaction of Nonnormal Persons, 41 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 207, 212 (1973)

(finding "no evidence of a difference between the handicapped and normals in self-reported life
satisfaction or its linguistic relatives").
70. David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make People Happy?
A FocusingIllusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI. 340, 340 (1998).
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of life. 71 It involved a small sample; its subjects had only one kind of
disabil;ty; and the subjects who had disabilities reported lower
happiness than did lottery winners and controls. Nonetheless,
subsequent research confirms that people have a "psychological
immune system that detects and neutralizes events that challenge
[their] sense of well-being." 72 Through a variety of defense
mechanisms-distraction, rationalization, illusion, and so forth-our
minds keep our happiness relatively stable. 73 Such hedonic adaptation
may involve changes "in interests, values, goals, attention, or
characterization of a situation"; it may involve "consciously directing
one's attention away from troubling thoughts"; and it may also involve
"cognitive transformations of situations-for example, by interpreting
a tragedy as a 'learning experience.' "74 Indeed, people who experience
adversity often find benefit in it, such as the "strengthening of
relationships with family and friends," the "development of greater
patience, tolerance, empathy, and courage," or a "valued change in
71. See Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 63, at 322 n.25 ("[E]vidence of hedonic
adaptation in the [Brickman] paper is not overwhelming.").
72. Wilson & Gilbert, Affective Forecasting,supra note 64, at 380 (citation omitted); accord
Daniel T. Gilbert, Elizabeth C. Pinel, Timothy D. Wilson, Stephen J. Blumberg & Thalia P.
Wheatley, Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, 75 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 619 (1998).
73. See Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg & Wheatley, supra note 72, at 619 ("Ego, defense,
rationalization, dissonance reduction, motivated reasoning, positive illusions, self-serving
attribution, self-deception, self-enhancement, self-affirmation, and self-justification are just some
of the terms that psychologists have used to describe the various strategies, mechanisms, tactics,
and maneuvers of the psychological immune system."); Wilson & Gilbert, Affective Forecasting,
supra note 64, at 371-74 (describing process by which we make sense of unexpected events and
then "ordinize" them "in a way that robs them of their emotional power"); see also Rebecca L.
Collins, Shelley E. Taylor & Laurie A. Skokan, A Better World or a Shattered Vision? Changes in
Life Perspectives Following Victimization, 8 SOC. COGNITION 263, 279-84 (1990) (discussing
coping strategies people employ following adverse life events); Shelley E. Taylor & David A.
Armor, Positive Illusions and Coping with Adversity, 64 J. PERSONALITY 873 passim (1996)
(discussing role of positive illusions in coping with adverse life events). For a general discussion
of psychological sense-making processes and "emotional evanescence," see Timothy D. Wilson,
Daniel T. Gilbert & David B. Centerbar, Making Sense: The Causes of Emotional Evanescence, in
1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS 209 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003).
Wilson and Gilbert have highlighted hindsight bias--"whereby people transform an event
psychologically after it occurs to make it seem more predictable than it really was"-as one of the
psychological tools that leads to the "evanescence" of negative emotions. Wilson & Gilbert,
Affective Forecasting, supra note 64, at 374. On hindsight bias generally, see Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 57686 (1998).
74. Frederick & Loewenstein, supra 'note 63, at 302-03; see also Shelley E. Taylor,
Adjustment to Threatening Events: A Theory of Cognitive Adaptation, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
1161, 1161 (1983) ("[The readjustment process focuses around three themes: a search for
meaning in the experience, an attempt to regain mastery over the event in particular and over
one's life more generally, and an effort to enhance one's self-esteem-to feel good about oneself
again despite the personal setback.").
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life's priorities and personal goals." 75 Through such adaptations, most
people in virtually all demographic groups-even those who
experience economic disadvantage or racial stigma-report positive
76
levels of happiness.
The general phenomenon holds true in the disability area. A
massive body of research has demonstrated that people who acquire a
range of disabilities typically do not experience much or any
permanent reduction in the enjoyment of life. 77 After an "initial
adjustment period," 78 people tend to adapt psychologically to having a
disability. Whether because they gain more accurate information on
their actual life and activity prospects, 79 or because their new
disability "forces reexamination, reconceptualization, and the
alternation of values, attitudes, beliefs, and desires," people with
disabilities experience a hedonic transformation.8 1 One researcher's
description of her own experience with partial paralysis illustrates the
point:
When I did [accept my disability], it wasn't at all like [I had] envisioned; settling for
second-rate goals and dreams. It wasn't even defusing the disappointment that I would
never again hear whistles when I walked, or dance, or ride in a horse show, or walk
alone in the rain, or go to the bathroom by myself. It sure as hell wasn't the much touted
process of discovering substitute gratifications for the ones I had lost.

75. Glenn Affleck & Howard Tennen, Construing Benefits From Adversity: Adaptational
Significance and DispositionalUnderpinnings,64 J. PERSONALITY 899, 902 (1996).
76. See Ed Diener & Carol Diener, Most People Are Happy, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 181, 181 (1996).
77. For a general discussion of this research, some of which is discussed in more detail in
the remainder of this section, see Carol J. Gill, Health Professionals, Disability, and Assisted
Suicide: An Examination of Relevant Empirical Evidence and Reply to Batavia, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 526, 528-29 (2000); see also M.G. Eisenberg & C.C. Saltz, Quality of Life Among Aging
Spinal Cord Injured Persons: Long Term Rehabilitation Outcomes, 29 PARAPLEGIA 514, 517
(1991) (collecting studies finding that "quality of life among those with even severely disabling
conditions may be as high as those with no disability"); Thomas Mehnert, Herbert H. Krauss,
Rosemary Nadler & Mary Boyd, Correlates of Life Satisfaction in Those with Disabling
Conditions, 35 REHABILITATION PSYCHOL. 3, 5 (1990) (collecting studies finding that people with
a variety of disabilities experience at least as much life satisfaction as nondisabling controls).
78. Carol J. Gill, Depression in the Context of Disability and the "'Right to Die", 25
THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 171, 185 (2004).
79. See Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom of the Ill: A
Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L. REV. 91, 111-12 (1993) (suggesting
the importance of the disability-related information deficit suffered by people without
disabilities).
80. Id. at 114.
81. See Marilynn J. Phillips, Disability and Ethnicity in Conflict: A Study in
Transformation, in WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES: ESSAYS IN PSYCHOLOGY, CULTURE, AND POLITICS

195, 196-200 (Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch eds., 1988) (discussing various theories of
transformation offered by researchers).

764

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:3:745

It was more like those things not only didn't matter any more, they wouldn't have
mattered even if I could still have done them. I didn't need to8 2be able to do them-or to
mourn their loss-in order to maintain some image of myself.

This kind of transformation is far from uncommon. Rather,
studies have shown that people with disabilities "ranging from
quadriplegia to blindness" tend to "report positive well-being" when
asked.8 3 Although people with spinal cord injuries report that they are
"very unhappy immediately following their trauma," most report that
they are happy by the third week after the accident.8 4 "[I]ndividuals
who use wheelchairs are believed to be happy by their friends and
family, can recall more good than bad events in their lives, are rated
as happy by an interviewer, and report more positive than negative
emotions in daily experience-sampling measures. 8' 5 People "with
severe, multiple handicaps" and people "with chronic mental
problems" also report high levels of subjective well-being.8 6 Similarly,
although burn injuries often cause "an initially severe impact" on wellbeing, the emotional impact "tend[s] to be transitory"; after roughly
twelve months, "[t]he majority of burn survivors appear to adjust
quite well to their injuries. '8 7 And "young patients with limb

82. Carolyn L. Vash, The Psychology of Disability, 22 REHABILITATION PSYCHOL. 145, 15253 (1975), excerpted in CAROLYN L. VASH & NANCY M. CREWE, PSYCHOLOGY OF DISABILITY 160
(2d ed. 2004). This quotation came to our attention because it is featured in Pryor, supra note 79,
at 115.
83. Diener & Diener, supra note 76, at 181.
84. Id.; see Camille B. Wortman & Roxane Cohen Silver, Coping with Irrevocable Loss, in
CATACLYSMS, CRISES, AND CATASTROPHES: PSYCHOLOGY IN ACTION 189, 198 (Gary R. VandenBos
& Brenda K. Bryant eds., 1987); see also C. Lundqvist, A. Siosteen, C. Blomstrand, B. Lind & M.
Sullivan, Spinal Cord Injuries: Clinical, Functional, and Emotional Status, 16 SPINE 78, 82
(1991) (finding that after four years, subjects with spinal cord injuries reported levels of
subjective well-being and quality of life that were similar to those of a non-disabled reference
group); G.G. Whiteneck, S.W. Charlifue, H.L. Frankel, M.H. Fraser, B.P. Gardner, K.A. Gerhart,
K.R. Krishnan, R.R. Menter, I. Nuseibeh & D.J. Short, Mortality, Morbidity, and Psychosocial
Outcomes of Persons Spinal Cord Injured More Than 20 Years Ago, 30 PARAPLEGIA 617, 626
(1992) ("Approximately three quarters of the subjects rated their current quality of life as either
good or excellent on a 5-point scale.").
85. Diener & Diener, supra note 76, at 184 (citation omitted).
86. Id. at 181; see also Richard Stensman, Severely Mobility-Disabled People Assess the
Quality of Their Lives, 17 SCANDINAVIAN J. REHABILITATION MED. 87, 89-91 (1985) (finding no
statistically significant difference in self-reported quality of life between subjects with severe
mobility impairments and non-disabled controls). Liz Emens argues that psychiatric disabilities,
at least, are "defined by... hedonic costs." Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator:
Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs, and the ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399, 423-28 (2006). Our discussion
focuses on injuries that cause physical or intellectual disabilities.
87. David R. Patterson, John J. Everett, Charles H. Bombardier, Kent A. Questad, Victoria
K. Lee & Janet A. Marvin, Psychological Effects of Severe Burn Injuries, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL.
362, 362, 370 (1993).
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deficiencies, as a group, appear to be relatively resilient to
88
maladjustment."
In a recent study, Jason Riis and his colleagues used the
technique of "ecological momentary assessment" ("EMA") to measure
the reported well-being of individuals who were undergoing kidney
dialysis.8 9 They found virtually no significant differences between
those individuals and a control group of individuals without major
health conditions. In particular, there was no statistically significant
difference between the two groups in reports of overall mood (a fivepoint scale from "very pleasant to very unpleasant") or in reports of
the extent to which they were experiencing nine specific emotions
("happy, joyful, pleased, enjoyment/fun, depressed/blue, unhappy,
frustrated, angry/hostile, worried/anxious"). 90 Nor were there
statistically significant differences in reports about pain, tiredness, or
overall life satisfaction. 91 The authors concluded "that hemodialysis
patients do, largely at least, adapt to their condition. Although they
report their health as being much worse than that of healthy controls,
they do not appear to be much, if at all, less happy thati people who do
92
not have kidney disease or any other serious health condition."
A recent longitudinal study conducted by two British
economists reported similar, though less pronounced, results. 93 Using
data from the British Household Panel Survey to "track[] individuals'
levels of reported life-satisfaction in the years leading up to, and after,
disability," they found "a striking degree of recovery in human
wellbeing" among those who have less severe disabilities. 94 But though
88. Vida L. Tyc, Psychosocial Adaptation of Children and Adolescents with Limb
Deficiencies:A Review, 12 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 275, 286 (1992).
89. See Jason Riis, George Loewenstein, Jonathan Baron, Christopher Jepson, Angela
Fagerlin & Peter A. Ubel, Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis: A Study Using
Ecological Momentary Assessment, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3 (2005). As the authors
describe the EMA method:
In EMA, subjects are given personal digital assistants (PDAs; e.g., Palm
Pilots) to carry with them wherever they go for a period of several days or
more. The method is designed to minimize the influence of biased recall. The
PDA prompts the subject to answer questions at random times throughout
the day. In studies of well-being, subjects are asked how they feel at that very
moment.
Id. at 4. See generally Arthur A. Stone, Saul S. Shiffman & Marten W. DeVries, Ecological
Momentary Assessment, in WELL-BEING, supra note 63, at 26-28 (discussing the EMA technique).
90. Riis, Loewenstein, Baron, Jepson, Fagerlin & Ubel, supra note 89, at 5-6.
91. Id. at 6.
92. Id. at 7.
93. Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? A Longitudinal
Study of Disability with Implications for Economists and Judges 14 (Nov. 1, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors).
94. Id. at 21.
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they found that "a person's emotional damage from disability reduces
through the years," they did not find "a complete return to the old
happiness level."95 For people with severe disabilities, the authors
found (based on a relatively small sample) that well-being recovers to
96 .
a similar degree, but more slowly.
Even in those instances where disability does durably reduce
subjective well-being, there is good reason to think that it is social
factors, and not anything intrinsic in the disability, that cause the
reduction. A meta-analysis of twenty-nine studies of self-reported
quality of life of individuals with spinal cord injuries found that those
individuals report a lower quality of life than do their non-disabled
peers.9 7 But the degree of an individual's impairment had only "a very
95. Id. at 21; see also Adrienne Asch, Distracted by Disability, 7 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 77, 80-81 (1998) (noting that "[niot everyone who has a disability is
satisfied with life" but that "overall disabled people believe that they can achieve enough of their
goals to make life worthwhile"); M. Kannisto & H. Sintonen, Later Health-Related Quality of Life
in Adults Who Have Sustained Spinal Cord Injury in Childhood,35 SPINAL CORD 747, 750 (1997)
(finding that adults who experienced spinal cord injuries in childhood reported a slightly, but
only slightly, lower health-related quality of life than did non-disabled controls); R. Stensman,
Adjustment to Traumatic Spinal Cord Injury: A Longitudinal Study of Self-Reported Quality of
Life, 32 PARAPLEGIA 416 (1994) (evaluating similar findings with individuals who experienced
their injuries in adulthood).
96. See Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 93, at 10.
97. See Marcel Dijkers, Quality of Life After Spinal Cord Injury: A Meta Analysis of the
Effects of Disablement Components, 35 SPINAL CORD 829, 835 (1997); see also Marcus J. Fuhrer,
Diana H. Rintala & Karen A. Hart, Relationship of Life Satisfaction to Impairment, Disability,
and Handicap Among Persons with Spinal Cord Injury Living in the Community, 73 ARCHIVES
PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILATION 552, 554 (1992) ("[OJn average, people with SCI who are living
in the community report a lower level of satisfaction with life than do people in the general
population."); Mehnert, Krauss, Nadler & Boyd, supra note 77, at 12 (finding that people with a
range of disabilities experience less life satisfaction than people without them, but that "[e]ven
among those who consider themselves severely disabled, and those who report themselves unable
to work or keep house, the majority indicate that they are at least somewhat satisfied with their
lives."); Richard Schulz & Susan Decker, Long-Term Adjustment to Physical Disability: The Role
of Social Support, Perceived Control, and Self-Blame, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1162,
1170 (1985) (reporting, in study of individuals with spinal cord injuries, that "the subjects in this
study reported a mean degree of well-being that was only slightly lower than that of other nondisabled adult populations."). But see Kathleen Chwalisz, Ed Diener & Dennis Gallagher,
Autonomic Arousal Feedback and Emotional Experience: Evidence From the Spinal Cord Injured,
54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 820, 823 (1988) (finding no statistically significant
differences between subjects with spinal cord injuries and non-disabled controls on most
measures of subjective well-being); L.A. Cushman & J. Hassett, Spinal Cord Injury: 10 and 15
Years After, 30 PARAPLEGIA 690, 694 (1992) (reporting that subjects with spinal cord injuries
"who were surveyed 10 and 15 years post injury rated their perceived quality of life as equal to or
somewhat better than that of their peers, on average"). Professors Ville and Ravaud note that
the studies finding a lower quality of life for people with spinal cord injuries often use measures
that beg the question by assuming that functional limitations necessarily limit well-being. See I.
Ville & J.F. Ravaud, Subjective Well-Being and Severe Motor Impairments: The Tetrafigap
Survey on the Long-Term Outcome of Tetraplegic Spinal Cord Injured Persons, 52 SOC. SCI. &
MED. 369, 370 (2001). See generally Tracey C. Lintern, J. Graham Beaumont, Pamela M.
Kenealy & Rachel C. Murrell, Quality of Life (QoL) in Severely Disabled Multiple Sclerosis
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minor effect" on reported quality of life. 98 Instead, the crucial
determinants were family involvement, work opportunities, mobility,
and social integration. 9 (Presumably, these factors contribute as well
to the expressed willingness of some persons with disabilities to pay
for a "cure" for their disabilities. 10 0 ) Disability does not inherently
limit an individual's opportunities along these dimensions; rather,
such limitations often "stem from the frustration of social rejection, of
physically inaccessible movies and restaurants, of inadequate social
gatherings, or of discrimination in the workplace." 10 1
The doctrine allowing hedonic damages for disabling injuries
fails to take account of the degree to which people with disabilities
adapt to their conditions. Contrary to the view of many of the courts
whose decisions we cited in Part 1,102 people with disabilities do not, by
Patients: Comparisonof Three QoL Measures Using MultidimensionalScaling, 10 QUALITY LIFE
RES. 371, 372 (2001) ("Most currently available forms of QoL assessment employ external value
systems; thus specific goals or activities important to the individual patient may not be included
in the measurement scale.")
98. Dijkers, supra note 97, at 833. But cf. Mehnert, Krauss, Nadler & Boyd, supra note 77,
at 10-12 (finding that degree of functional limitation was directly associated with reduced life
satisfaction, but that "social interactional variables" were important as well).
99. See Dijkers, supra note 97, at 835; see also Brent W. Chase, Thomas A. Cornille & R.
William English, Life SatisfactionAmong Persons with Spinal Cord Injuries, J. REHABILITATION,
July-Sept. 2000, at 14, 18-19 (finding that marital status and "perceived control"-the ability to
make decisions about one's life-were the most significant predictors of positive life satisfaction
among people with spinal cord injuries, and that the opportunity to direct personal assistants
and the availability of at least part-time work were highly correlated with positive perceptions of
control); Ashley R. Craig, Karen M. Hancock & Hugh G. Dickson, Spinal Cord Injury: A Search
for Determinants of Depression Two Years After the Event, 33 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 221,
227 (1994) (finding that physical pain and perceived loss of control of one's life were the major
determinants of depression in people with spinal cord injuries, and that "medical characteristics
such as level of lesion and completeness of lesion" were not associated with depression); Fuhrer,
Rintala & Hart, supra note 97, at 555-56 (finding that the social factors of disablement, and not
the degree of medical impairment, were the determinants of lower life satisfaction among people
with spinal cord injuries); Schulz & Decker, supra note 97, at 1170 ("Persons [with spinal cord
injuries] who had high levels of social support, were satisfied with their social contacts, and felt
that they had high levels of control reported high levels of well-being."); Vappu Viemero &
Christina Krause, Quality of Life in Individuals with PhysicalDisabilities,67 PSYCHOTHERAPY &
PSYCHOSOMATICS 317, 321 (1998) (finding that social factors, and not the degree of medical
impairment, were key determinants of life satisfaction in individuals with disabilities); Ville &
Ravaud, supra note 97, at 370, 377-79 (noting that self-reported well-being measures in
individuals with spinal cord injuries "increase with increased quality and richness of social
contacts" and with "indicators of social status such as income and level of education" as well as
occupational level, and reporting results of study showing that similar "sociological variables"
play a major role in perceived well-being).
100. See infra notes 145-147.
101. Asch, supra note 95, at 80; see also Nancy Weinberg, Physically Disabled People Assess
the Quality of Their Lives, 45 REHABILITATION LITERATURE 12, 14 (1984) (finding that
"adjustment to societal attitudes was the most difficult" for interview subjects with disabilities).
See infra text accompanying notes 148-160 (providing analysis development on this point).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 34-62.
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and large, experience disability as inherently and sharply limiting
their enjoyment of life. And even those courts that identify particular
pleasure-creating activities that people with disabilities can no longer
perform are missing two significant points. First, the degree to which
10 3
disability actually limits those activities is often overstated.
Although courts frequently suggest that a disabling injury makes an
individual unable to have sex, participate in athletics, and otherwise
lead an active life,104 that is not generally true. People with disabilities
can still have sex,1 0 5 work, 10 6 compete athletically and go to
10 8
ballgames, 10 7 and participate in other activities in the community.
Second, and more fundamental, hedonic adaptation often works by
transforming what one values and enjoys. Even if a disability prevents
an individual from performing a task that she previously enjoyed, she
will not necessarily experience that as an hedonic loss. People who
acquire spinal cord injuries, for example, come to believe that "mental
functioning, communication, social participation, and seeing"-all
things they can still do-are more important to their enjoyment of life
than mobility. 10 9
More generally, they begin to think of autonomy as consisting
in being "in charge of how, when, by whom, and in what ways certain
tasks are performed" rather than in personally performing those
tasks.1 1 0 By this process, the inability to move around without a
103. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 47-62 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Colette Ray & Julia West, Social, Sexual, and Personal Implications of
Paraplegia,22 PARAPLEGIA 75, 75-76, 81-83 (1984) (describing ability of people with spinal cord
injuries to have sex, despite obstacles). For extensive discussions of sex and disability, from very
different perspectives, see TOM SHAKESPEARE, KATH GILLESPIE-SELLS & DOMINIC DAVIES, THE
SEXUAL POLITICS OF DISABILITY: UNTOLD DESIRES (1996); THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL
IMPACT OF PHYSICAL DISABILITY 207-55 (Robert P. Marinelli & Arthur E. Dell Orto eds., 1977).
106. The employment rate for people with disabilities does lag well behind that of people
without disabilities, but that is to a large extent the result of discrimination and the lack of
social services for which courts could compensate directly. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future
of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 19-54 (2004).
107. See, e.g., Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(requiring sports arena to provide wheelchair users seating areas with a line of sight over
standing spectators); Disabled Sports USA, http://www.dsusa.org.
108. See, e.g., Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126,
1132-33 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring movie theaters to be accessible to people who use wheelchairs).
109. Kannisto & Sintonen, supra note 95, at 747; see also Schulz & Decker, supra note 97, at
1171 (noting that individuals with spinal cord injuries "saw themselves as better off than most
non-disabled persons," and that they did so "partly by selectively focusing on attributes that
made them appear advantaged (e.g., brain is more important than brawn)"); Weinberg, supra
note 101, at 14 (making similar observations, but noting that the process of adjustment "was not
always easy").
110. Asch, supra note 95, at 79; see also id. ("The father or mother who accompanies a child
to a sporting event supervises the child even if they are both driven by an assistant because the
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wheelchair, or to dress and bathe oneself, is not perceived as an
hedonic loss. Indeed, people who acquire disabilities often come to find
that "[t]hey have incorporated the disabilities into their identities, into
their very selves. And they see their experiences as yielding much that
is positive in their personal growth." ' And many people with
disabilities state that they would refuse, if offered, a risk-free surgery
that would completely cure their disabilities, because they "fear that
12
they would no longer be the same person."'
B. The Views of People Without Disabilities:Of Affective Forecasting
The discussion in the previous Section should demonstrate that
people who acquire disabilities do not find that their enjoyment of life
is impaired-perhaps not at all, and at least not substantially. But
people without disabilities think differently. They tend to believe that
disability inevitably has a very negative effect on the enjoyment and
quality of one's life."13 This is true of the general public, 114 and it is
true even of professionals who spend a great deal of time interacting
with people with disabilities. Reviewing over a dozen studies, Carol
Gill found it "consistent and stunning" that "health professionals
significantly underestimate the quality of life of persons with
disabilities compared with the actual assessments made by persons
' 15
with disabilities themselves." "
child is too young to drive and the parent's seizure disorder makes driving unsafe. The woman
with a mobility impairment whose personal assistant shops for food she selects is no less in
charge of her life than the woman who trades shopping for babysitting so that she and her friend
can both maintain homes and work lives.").
111. PAUL K. LONGMORE, Medical Decision Making and People with Disabilities:A Clash of
Cultures, in WHY I BURNED MY BOOK AND OTHER ESSAYS ON DISABILITY 204, 209 (2003).

112. Weinberg, supra note 101, at 13.
113. See NATIONAL COUNCIL .ON DISABILITY, ASSISTED SUICIDE: A POSITION PAPER 22-25

(1997), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroonipublications/1997/suicide.htm Oast visited
Feb. 15, 2007).
114. See Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 64, at 92 (discussing "very substantial
evidence" that healthy people underestimate the quality of life of sick people"); George
Loewenstein, Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility,
118 Q.J. ECON. 1209, 1212 (2003) ("[C]ross-sectional studies have consistently found that
nonpatients' predictions of the quality of life associated with serious medical conditions are lower
than actual patients' self-reported quality of life."); see also Asch, supra note 95, at 82 (discussing
how the Oregon health rationing plan incorporated biases toward disability through the use of a
public quality-of-life survey); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct as Risk
Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1508 & n.12 (2001) (same).

115. Gill, supra note 77, at 530; see also John R. Bach & Denise I. Campagnolo, Psychosocial
Adjustment of Post-poliomyelitis Ventilator Assisted Individuals, 73 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. &
REHABILITATION 934, 934 (1992) ("Muscular Dystrophy Association clinic directors significantly
underestimated life satisfaction reported by Duchenne muscular dystrophy ventilator users.");
John R. Bach & Margaret C. Tilton, Life Satisfaction and Well-Being Measures in Ventilator
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That finding should not be stunning, however. When
attempting to assess how people in unfamiliar situations feel, we often
do so by seeking to predict how we ourselves would feel in those
circumstances. 116 And a large body of evidence demonstrates that we
tend to do a very poor job of predicting our own future happiness. 1 17 In
particular, there is a great deal of evidence that we "overestimate the
enduring impact that future events will have on our emotional
reactions" 8 and thus underestimate our ability to adapt to adverse
life events." 19

Assisted Individuals with Traumatic Tetraplegia, 75 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. &
REHABILITATION 626, 630 (1994) (finding that non-disabled health care professionals
significantly underestimated the life satisfaction expressed by individuals with spinal cord
injuries); Eugenia Bodenhamer, Jeanne Achterberg-Lawlis, George Kevorkia, Anne Belanus &
Jeanne Cofer, Staff and Patient Perceptionsof the Psychosocial Concerns of Spinal Cord Injured
Persons, 62 AM. J. PHYSICAL MED. 182, 182 (1983) (citing studies that "revealed significant
discrepancies between the way professional staff view spinal cord injured patients' psychological
reactions and the responses the patients actually report"); Laura A. Cushman & Marcel P.
Dijkers, Depressed Mood in Spinal Cord Injured Patients: Staff Perceptions and PatientRealities,
71 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 191, 195 (1990) (finding "a consistent bias on
the part of [rehabilitation facility] staff to overestimate depressed mood, relative to the report of
patients themselves"); Frederick A. Ernst, Contrasting Perceptions of Distress by Research
Personnel and Their Spinal Cord Injured Subjects, 66 AM. J. PHYSICAL MED. 12, 13-14 (1987)
(reporting results similar to the Bodenhamer study).
116. See Leaf Van Boven & George Loewenstein, Social Projection of TransientDrive States,
29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1159, 1162, 1165 (2003).
117. See Blumenthal, supra note 19, at 162 ("[Sjubstantial empirical evidence demonstrates
that people are in fact unable to accurately predict their own or others' emotional states."). See
generally Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 64, at 88-94 (reviewing the literature).
118. Wilson & Gilbert, Affective Forecasting,supra note 64, at 351.
119. See Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg & Wheatley, supra note 72, at 633 (reporting
results of studies in which subjects "overestimated the duration of their affective reactions to
romantic disappointments, career difficulties, political defeats, distressing news, clinical
devaluations, and personal rejections"); Loewenstein, O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 114, at
1213 (discussing research suggesting "underappreciation of adaptation"); George Loewenstein &
Shane Frederick, PredictingReactions to Environmental Change, in ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS, AND
BEHAVIOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL VALUATION AND DEGRADATION 52, 66 (Max H.
Bazerman, David M. Messick, Ann E. Tenbrunsel & Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni eds., 1997)
(reporting results of a study of predicted reactions to environmental change in which the subjects
"seem[ed] to expect changes in their circumstances to affect their quality of life in the future
more than equivalent things have affected their quality of life in the past"); Riis, Loewenstein,
Baron, Jepson, Fagerlin & Ubel, supra note 89, at 3 ("Research in diverse domains has
documented a general tendency for people to underestimate their own and others' speed of
adaptation to negative as well as positive outcomes."); Timothy D. Wilson, Thalia Wheatley,
Jonathan M. Meyers, Daniel T. Gilbert & Danny Axsom, Focalism:A Source of DurabilityBias in
Affective Forecasting,78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 821, 829 (2000) (finding that "[clollege
football fans overestimated the extent to which the outcome of a football game would influence
their overall happiness"); Wilson & Gilbert, Affective Forecasting,supra note 64, at 353 ("The
impact bias has been found in a variety of populations (e.g., college students, professors, sports
fans, dieters, vacationers, snake phobics, people taking medical tests), with a wide range of
emotional events (e.g., romantic breakups, personal insults, sports victories, electoral defeats,
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In the context of disability, this failure of affective forecasting
interacts with and feeds the general societal view that disability is a
tragedy and that the non-disabled should pity people with
disabilities. 120 There is no doubt that disability is a condition that is
subject to a great deal of social stigma. 12 1 As a result, "[m]any able122
bodied persons are tremendously fearful about becoming disabled,"'
and they believe that disabilities are far more limiting than they
actually are.1 23 That fear may stem from " 'existential anxiety' "-the
fear that one will eventually become disabled oneself. 124 Or it may
simply reflect the well-documented psychological "tendency to
automatically associate positive characteristics with [one's] ingroups
more easily than outgroups" and "to associate negative characteristics
with outgroups more easily than ingroups."' 25 As members of a

parachute jumps, failures to lose weight, reading tragic stories, and learning the results of
pregnancy and HIV tests.").
120. See infra note 155 and accompanying text; see also Beatrice A. Wright, Attitudes and the
Fundamental Negative Bias: Conditions and Corrections,in ATTITUDES TOWARD PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES 3, 8 (Harold E. Yuker ed., 1988) (collecting studies showing "the ease with which
devalued groups are regarded as unfortunate, despite the fact that members of those groups do
not view themselves as unfortunate").
121. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability",86 VA. L. REV. 397,
436-45 (2000).
122. Paul Steven Miller, The Impact of Assisted Suicide on Persons with Disabilities-IsIt a
Right Without Freedom?, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 47, 49 (1993).
123. See Bagenstos, supranote 121, at 423-24.
124. Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA- UnreasonableBias or Biased Reasoning?,
in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS 26, 34 (Linda Hamilton
Krieger ed., 2003); Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Physical Differences: Disability and
Discrimination,44 J. Soc. ISS. 39, 42-45 (1988); see also Miller, supra note 122, at 53 ("The root
of prejudice against people with disabilities comes from several sources. Foremost is that of fear:
fear of the loss of autonomy and the 'there but for the grace of God go I' realization that disability
can 'afflict' any person. Such fears are, of course, based on the prejudicial assumptions about life
with a disability that society itself creates. Able-bodied people see 'confinement' to a wheelchair,
or reliance upon attendant care, or a lack of hearing or vision, as losses of independence, which,
in this society, is often regarded as worse than death itself. Furthermore, nothing in our society
is despised like difference. Because our society assumes difference is the equivalent of inferiority
and treats people with visible differences accordingly, people have grave fears about being
viewed as deviating from accepted societal norms."). See generally R. William English, Correlates
of Stigma Toward Physically Disabled Persons, in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF
PHYSICAL DISABILITY, supra note 105, at 162.
125. Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their
Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 146 (2004). For discussions in the legal
literature of this general phenomenon, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the
Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2006); Clark Freshman, Whatever
Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science Theories Identify Discriminationand Promote
Coalitions Between 'Different" Minorities, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 383-409 (2000). For a good
overview of theories and research on the attitudes of people without disabilities toward people
with disabilities, see generally ATTITUDES TOWARD PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, supra note 120.
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socially stigmatized class, people with disabilities are a classic
outgroup.
It is true, of course, that under what is (unintuitively) called
the "Golden Rule," jurors are not supposed to figure damages by
asking how much money they themselves would want in exchange for
experiencing the injury in question. 126 Nonetheless, jurors must
calculate damages using some sense of the value of a loss-and their
own perspective is unavoidable when they assign that value. Thus
when judges and jurors make decisions about what damages properly
compensate for disabling injuries, they are likely to hold and use the
non-disabled public's pessimistic views of disabled quality of life. Very
few judges have disabilities.1 27 And individuals with disabilities are
often excluded from juries. 128 As Wendy Hensel has written in the
context of "wrongful birth" actions, jurors tend to have a "distance
from the disabled perspective" that leaves them "subject to bias and
prejudice." 129 The Schindler case we discussed in Part I.B. above, in
which judges and jurors disregarded extensive evidence that the sixyear-old plaintiff with three amputated toes had in fact adapted
hedonically, is hardly a surprise in this context.1 3 0
Indeed, the litigation process itself is structured in a manner
that is likely to trigger the very cognitive shortcuts that make
affective forecasting so flawed. Daniel Gilbert and his colleagues have
found that our tendency to be unaware of our own "psychological
immune systems"-they term this tendency "immune neglect"-is a
substantial contributor to our inability to predict adaptation to

126. See McCaffery, Kahneman & Spitzer, supra note 19, at 1383-87 (discussing this "golden
rule" and lawyers' ways around it). See generally L.R. James, Annotation, Instructions in a
PersonalInjury Action Which, in Effect, Tell Jurors That in Assessing Damages They Should Put
Themselves in Injured Person'sPlace, 96 A.L.R.2d 760 (1964).
127. See Brown Will Present at ABA

Conference, THIRD BRANCH, Spring 2006, at 12,

available at http://www.wicourts.gov/news/thirdbranch/docs/spring06.pdf (last visited Feb. 15,
2007) ("While statistics on lawyers and judges with disabilities nationwide have not been reliably
gathered, [Wisconsin Court of Appeals Judge Richard] Brown said he knows of two blind judges
and that he currently is the nation's only deaf judge.") Given the age of the members of the
judiciary, it stands to reason that there are some with mobility impairments, and others
presumably have less visible disabilities.
128. In the past, that exclusion took the form of categorical statutory prohibitions, some of
which remain on the statute books. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 524 n.9 (2004) (citing
statutes from Tennessee and Michigan). Today, it more often occurs through the use of
peremptory challenges. See generally Andrew Weis, Peremptory Challenges: The Last Barrier to
Jury Service for People with Disabilities,33 WILLAMEYFE L. REV. 1 (1997).
129. Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions,
40 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 185 (2005).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 50-62.
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adverse events. 131 Because the presentation of evidence in litigation
emphasizes the pain and unhappiness plaintiffs have felt due to their
injuries, it further directs jurors' attention away from the likelihood of
hedonic adaptation.
Even more, the litigation process encourages "focalism,"
another key contributor to the inability to predict adaptation.
"Focalism" is a phenomenon under which people who are asked to
predict an event's effects on happiness "focus too much on the
occurrence in question" and "fail to consider the consequences of other
events that are likely to occur": "People think about the focal event in
a vacuum without reminding themselves that their lives will not occur
in a vacuum but will be filled with many other events." 132 A trial, of
course, focuses attention on the particular injury, 133 and "when
attention is drawn to the possibility of a change in any significant
aspect of life, the perceived effect of this change on well-being is likely
to be exaggerated." 134 Such focalism is likely to be particularly strong
in cases where non-disabled jurors must assess the prospects of
happiness with a disability. As Paul Longmore has written,
" 'outsiders,' non-disabled people, latch onto a single trait (for example,
paraplegia or arthritic pain), while 'insiders,' people with disabilities,
take into account the full range of their experience."135
It is only to be expected, then, that judicial decisions on hedonic
damages understate the experienced happiness of people with
disabilities. Both the general inability to predict that happiness will
adapt following adverse events and the social stigma toward disability
are intensified for participants in legal processes. In the next Part, we
discuss the normative and policy implications of these observations.

III. NORMATIVE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In the previous Part, we showed that people with disabilities
tend to have strikingly different views than non-disabled people
131. Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg & Wheatley, supra note 72, at 619, 633; see also
Wilson & Gilbert, Affective Forecasting,supra note 64, at 369 ("A major source of the impact bias,
we suggest, is that people fail to anticipate the extent to which they will transform events
psychologically in ways that ameliorate their impact.").
132. Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert & Axsom, supra note 119, at 822; see also Wilson &
Gilbert, Affective Forecasting,supra note 64, at 366 ("By neglecting to consider how much these
other events will capture their attention and influence their emotions, people overestimate the
impact of the focal event.").
133. See Schkade & Kahneman, supra note 70, at 340 ("[A] judge who tries to imagine the
life of a paraplegic or of a lottery winner will naturally focus attention on the special
circumstances of these cases.").
134. Id.

135. LONGMORE, supra note 111, at 209.
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regarding the effect a disability has on the enjoyment of life. In
particular, people with disabilities tend to adapt to their conditions, to
the extent that they experience as much (or nearly as much)
enjoyment of life as do non-disabled people. People without
disabilities, by contrast, tend to believe that disability inevitably
makes life substantially less enjoyable. Where non-disabled jurors and
judges decide how much to compensate for the hedonic costs of
disabling injuries, then, they are likely to operate on the basis of a
view that is not the view of many or most people with disabilities.
But that is merely a descriptive point. As a normative and
policy matter, the question remains: How should the law of hedonic
damages respond to disabling injuries? The mere fact that people with
and without disabilities have different views regarding the hedonic
effects of disability does not determine whose views should control.
Moreover, as the psychological evidence discussed in the previous Part
makes clear, people with disabilities themselves have an array of
views regarding the effects of disability on the enjoyment of life.
Where individual plaintiffs with disabling injuries convince juries that
they have experienced a loss of life's pleasures, should their views be
irrelevant simply because they may reflect a minority position among
people with disabilities?
In this Part, we address the normative question that the
discussion in the previous Part leaves open: How should the law of
hedonic damages respond to the tendency of non-disabled people to
believe that disabling injuries limit life's enjoyment far more than
people with disabilities tend to experience? We believe that the law
should not award any damages for loss of enjoyment of life based on
disability. When courts uphold hedonic damages awards based on the
view that disabling injuries limit life's enjoyment and keep plaintiffs
from being a "whole person," they entrench the societal view that
disability is inherently tragic, and encourage people with disabilities
to see their lives as tragedies. The view of disability as tragedy, for
which the proper response is pity, charity, or compensation, has been
one of the major targets of disability rights activists (and we endorse
their campaign).13 6 But we also argue that it is important to
disaggregate the various ways in which disability can limit life's
pleasures. The law can compensate for some of the negative results of
disablement without sending the message that disability is a tragedy;
others are at least in part the result of a society and a legal regime
that consistently send the message that disability is tragic. In

136. See JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 24 (1993); Bagenstos, supra note 121, at 427-28.
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particular, we contend that while tort law should compensate for the
physical pain and societal exclusion resulting from disabling injuries,
as well as for the cost of medical care, assistive technology, and
personal assistance, there should be no recovery for hedonic losses
believed to attend disability.
Our argument in this Part proceeds as follows. In Section A, we
confront a prominent argument against using the views of people
without disabilities to measure the degree to which disability limits
the enjoyment of life-the argument that adaptive preferences,
including the views of people with disabilities, may be psychologically
healthy but ought not to guide policy. As the preceding Sections
demonstrate, we agree that the views of people with disabilities reflect
adaptive preferences, but we argue that this recognition should start,
not end, the discussion. Whether the law should use as a standard the
(adaptive) preferences of people with disabilities, or instead the (in
some ways equally adaptive) preferences of people without disabilities,
depends on a normative inquiry into whether it is better to incorporate
one or the other set of preferences into policy.
In the succeeding Sections, we identify two bad consequences of
incorporating into tort damages the non-disabled perspective that
disability inevitably limits enjoyment of life. In Section B, we contend
that a legal doctrine founded on a view that disability inevitably limits
life's enjoyment encourages paternalism and pity and distracts
political attention from efforts to change the social, attitudinal, and
physical barriers that make impairments disabling. In Section C, we
argue that such a doctrine also is likely in many cases to harm
affected individuals with disabilities by augmenting the negative
consequences of their injury.
We then turn to other important normative considerations. In
Section D, we respond to a series of possible objections to our
argument-that it counsels psychologically unhealthy denial of the
effects of trauma, that it underdeters, and that it undercompensates.
Finally, in Section E, we consider the complex relationship between
our argument and the antipaternalist position of most disability rights
activists.
A. Taking Adaptive Preferences Seriously
When people with disabilities experience their lives as just as
happy as those of people without disabilities, that experience often
results from hedonic adaptation. That is the import of the studies
discussed in Part II.A. Should we, then, disregard those experiences?
Professors John McKie, Peter Singer, Helga Kuhse, and Jeff
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Richardson have argued, indeed, that public policy should disregard
the views individu'als with disabilities hold about the quality of their
lives, if those views are the result of the individuals' having
"adjust[ed] psychologically to their condition." 137 But they offer no
reason to use the experiences of non-disabled people as the starting
point for analysis. The assumed neutral baseline of non-disability is
not, in fact, neutral; the preferences and experiences of people without
disabilities are just as conditioned by their situations as are those of
people with disabilities. 13 Neither people with nor those without
disabilities have epistemic access to the "true" enjoyment of life with a
disability. 139
This point stands in tension with one of the most prominent
discussions of adaptive preferences. Amartya Sen has argued that a
"blind or disabled" person should not be denied redistribution simply
because his "cheerful and resilient temperament" keeps him from
experiencing less happiness. 140 Such a person, Sen argued, "is really
much more deprived [than others] in terms of what he can do" and
should not, because of his "buoyancy," be forced to "forgo the help that
he could otherwise claim from the society."1 4 1 Sen is, of course, correct
that disability limits available modes of activity: By definition,
mobility impairments impede walking; visual impairments impede

137. MCKIE, SINGER, KUHSE & RICHARDSON, supra note 21, at 34.

138. Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings, in WOMEN,
CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 61, 91 (Martha C. Nussbaum &
Jonathan Glover eds., 1995) (describing men's preferences to remain in a privileged position as
being just as conditioned as women's preferences for their subordinated position). Richard Abel
comes close to arguing that there is simply no way to compare and assess the views of people
with disabilities against the views of people without them about disabled persons' quality of life.
See Richard Abel, General Damages are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, and
Inegalitarian(But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 277 (2006) ("Profound injury,
like serious illness, transforms lives. But though no one would choose to suffer the
transformation, those different lives are just that-different, neither better nor worseincommensurable with each other and incapable of being given a financial equivalent.").
139. Cf. McCaffery, Kahneman & Spitzer, supra note 19, at 1389 (arguing, for similar
reasons, that neither an ex ante nor an ex post perspective on non-pecuniary damages "is more
'accurate' than the other"). This issue has some parallels in the debate regarding whether public
or expert assessments of risk are correct. Those who favor the experts' assessments believe that
the general public's risk perceptions are biased in a variety of ways; those who favor the public's
assessment believe that nonexperts are not biased but simply have a richer theory of risk than
do the experts. For a discussion of this debate, see Bagenstos, supra note 114, at 1485-86; see
also Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and PublicPolicy, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 149, 150 (2006) (arguing that disputes like these are not empirical but instead reflect
"cultural commitments [that] are prior to factual beliefs on highly charged political issues").
140. SEN, supra note 3,at 318.
141. Id. (emphasis added); see also Nussbaum, supra note 138, at 91 (arguing we should not
"rely on utility [measured by preference-satisfaction] as our measure of life quality," because of
the phenomenon of adaptive preferences).
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seeing; and so on. Still, the language of "deprivation" is, to our minds,
uncomfortably geared towards a non-disabled baseline. Mobility via a
wheelchair, for example, can be much faster than walking; 142 and
blind people who know Braille can read in the dark. More important,
calling the effect of disability a "real[]" deprivation does not change
the point, which we discuss below (and which has its own large
literature), that it is not physical impairments that limit activity but
societal choices that exclude people with impairments. 143 A mobility
impairment need not impede getting to work, for example, if
transportation and buildings are wheelchair accessible. And of course
Sen, who was not focusing on the question we are considering, did not
contend that there is such a thing as ontologically "real" happiness.
Accordingly, the choice of frame for assessment of hedonic
damages cannot rest on the unexamined use of the word "real."
Rather, it requires a normative determination of which views would be
best to credit. 144 And that determination, we suggest, requires an
assessment of outcomes: Which views, when incorporated in policy,
would lead to better consequences? Awarding hedonic damages based

142. In marathons, for example, wheelchair racers routinely beat runners by over a half
hour. See, e.g., Frank Litsky, Boston, Again, Belongs to Kenyans, But This Time Americans Serve
Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2006, at D5 (describing men's running victor with course record time
of 2 hours 7 minutes, and wheelchair victor with time of 1 hour 25 minutes).
143. See infra text accompanying notes 148-160.
144. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1542 (1998) (stating that whether "a person's
measure of welfare after (for example) becoming ill [is] the appropriate measure of value" raises
"a complex normative question"); Paul Menzel, Paul Dolan, Jeff Richardson & Jan Abel Olsen,
The Role of Adaptation to Disability and Disease in Health State Valuation: A Preliminary
Normative Analysis, 55 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2149, 2150 (2002) (stating that the question whether
policy should incorporate the adaptive views of people with disabilities and diseases regarding
their quality of life "is fundamentally normative"). This is a major point of Mark Kelman's recent
work on the implications of hedonic psychology for welfarism. See Mark Kelman, Hedonic
Psychology and the Ambiguities of 'Welfare", 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 391, 410 (2005). Kelman's
work elaborates on themes he has been exploring since 1979. See generally Mark Kelman, Choice
and Utility, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 769; cf. Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement
Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401-21 (1981) (arguing that the notion of efficiency
itself provides no basis to decide whether to use offer or asking prices in cost-benefit analysis and
that therefore "the analyst will have to make a choice" based on some extrinsic principle). The
idea underlies Ellen Smith Pryor's work, as well. In an argument against what she terms the
"insurance theory" of tort damages, Pryor has argued that even if people with disabilities believe
that the marginal utility of money is higher pre-injury than post-injury (for example, if a
"disabled person... conclude[s] that money has been less valuable after injury, at least in part
because she has faced social and attitudinal barriers that have diminished the uses of her money
and the satisfaction she can garner from those uses), those views cannot be a proper foundation
for reduced compensation." Pryor, supra note 79, at 119. Normatively, Pryor argues, beliefs that
are "the product of a social order that is unjustifiably hostile and nonaccommodating to the
disabled" should not be instantiated by the legal system to diminish opportunities for people with
disabilities further. Id. at 120, 145.
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on the view that disability inevitably limits life's enjoyment, we seek
to show in the next two sections, has bad consequences.
To be clear, we do not deny that disability causes harm, even in
the view of people with disabilities. What we deny is that disability
itself necessarily limits happiness. It should be clear that disabling
injuries typically require the injured person to pay substantial out-ofpocket costs-for medical care, rehabilitation services, assistive
technologies, and personal assistance.1 45 Disabling injuries often also
cause physical pain. 14 6 Because of hostile attitudes and our
inaccessible environment, disability also often leads to loss of
opportunities to work and participate in society.147 The studies
discussed in Part II.A suggest that it is these social factors, and not
anything inherent in disability, that makes some people with
disabilities less happy. Courts can, therefore, award damages for those
disability-related injuries without endorsing the view that disability
inherently limits happiness-and we would urge them to do so, in
appropriate cases. But damages for lost enjoyment of life are different,
because of the negative consequences we detail below.
B. EncouragingPity and DistractingAttention from Societal Choices
that Create Disability
As Part I demonstrated, hedonic damages cases are filled with
reasoning, arguments, and findings that endorse and instantiate a
view of disability as personal tragedy. That view is very prevalent in
our society. The standard narrative of disability is one of "some
terrible chance event which occurs at random to unfortunate
individuals." 148 In that narrative, disability is a problem that resides
in the individual with a disability. 49 It is a medical characteristic that
should be fixed through health care and rehabilitation if possible, and
that should be compensated with charity or public assistance if not. 150
But disability rights activists have mounted a persuasive
challenge to that individualistic view. In their view (and ours),
disability is not "an inherent personal characteristic that should
ideally be fixed" but is instead "a characteristic that draws its
145. See Pryor, supra note 79, at 117 (discussing "the centrality of money to a disabled
lifestyle"); see also Bagenstos, supra note 106, at 25-26 (discussing the importance of, inter alia,
assistive technology and personal assistance to people with disabilities).
146. For a good discussion of pain, see Ellen Smith Pryor, Compensation and the
IneradicableProblems of Pain, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239, 245-57 (1991).
147. See Bagenstos, supra note 121, at 419-25.
148. MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 27 (1996).

149. Bagenstos, supra note 121, at 427.
150. For elaboration of this and some of the other ideas in this section, see id. at 42 7-32.
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meaning from social context." 151 In particular, disability is what occurs
when a physical or mental condition interacts with social structures
and attitudes to create disadvantage. A person who uses a wheelchair,
in this view, is disabled only because so many buildings, sidewalks,
and modes of transportation are inaccessible, and because so many
152
people have negative attitudes toward people who use wheelchairs.
Although impairments plainly impose limits, it is not the impairment
alone that has disabled her, but "the set of social choices that has
created a built environment that confines wheelchair users to their
153
homes."
Disability rights activists have supported this "social model" of
disability in part because it seems to capture the true nature of
disability. As a "natural" matter, abilities lie on a spectrum; it is social
choices that make some limitations on some abilities "disabling" and
others not. 154 And examples of social choices that deprive people with
certain impairments of opportunities are everywhere you look:
inaccessible buildings; work schedules that are designed without
taking account of the needs of some people (e.g., people with diabetes)
to take frequent short breaks; and the "spread effect" in which people
assume that an impairment limits more functions, and more severely,
55
than it actually does.1
But disability rights activists also support the social model for
more consequentialist reasons. When society sees disability as an
individual tragedy, the policy response is an individualized one that
focuses on the person with a disability. She must attempt to get cured
or rehabilitated-a process that may consume an enormous amount of
56
time and effort without ultimately achieving much functional gain.

151. Id. at 427.
152. Adrian Furnham & Rebecca Thompson, Actual and Perceived Attitudes of Wheelchair
Users, 7 COUNSELING PSYCHOL. Q. 35 (1994); William Drew Gouvier, Robert C. Coon, Mark E.
Todd & Kristi Hulce Fuller, Verbal Interactions with Individuals Presenting With and Without
Physical Disability, 39 REHABILITATION PSYCHOL. 263 (1994); Michael J. Millington, Douglas C.
Strohmer, Chris A. Reid & Paul M. Spengler, A Preliminary Investigation of the Role of
Differential Complexity and Response Style in Measuring Attitudes Towards People with
Disabilities,41 REHABILITATION PSYCHOL. 243, 250 (1996); Sam B. Morgan & Dale W. Wisely,
Children's Attitudes and Behavioral Intentions Toward a Peer Presented as Physically
Handicapped:A More Positive View, 8 J. DEVELOPMENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITIES 29 (1996)
("The general conclusion to be drawn from most of the literature on children's attitudes towards
persons with physically [sic] handicaps is that these attitudes are negative.").
153. Bagenstos, supra note 121, at 429.
154. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL

ABILITIES 87-91 (1983).
155. On

the

spread effect,

see,

e.g., BEATRICE

A. WRIGHT, PHYSICAL

DISABILITY-A

PSYCHOSOCIAL APPROACH 32-39 (2d ed. 1983); Bagenstos, supra note 121, at 423-24.
156. See OLIVER, supra note 148, at 31-37.
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If that fails, she must accept the charity or welfare that goes with
being a member of the "deserving poor"-acceptance that stigmatizes
her as less than a full citizen. 157 And in all events she is subject to the
paternalistic control of bureaucrats and professionals: doctors,
rehabilitation professionals, welfare caseworkers, and so forth. 158 The
individualistic approach thus removes very little of the disadvantage
attached to disability, and it in fact exacerbates that disadvantage in a
number of ways.
The social model, by contrast, directs attention not at the
individual with a disability but at the array of social choices that
create most of the disadvantage attached to disability: "Once one
thinks of disability as arising primarily from the human environment,
rather than from anything inherent in an individual's physical or
mental condition, it 'becomes a problem of social choice and meaning,
a problem for which all onlookers are responsible.' "159 The social
model's policy implications primarily focus not on rehabilitation or
charity but on eliminating the physical, social, and attitudinal
barriers that make some physical and mental impairments disabling.
The Americans with Disabilities Act, with its broad requirements of
and
reasonable
accommodation,
physical
accessibility,
to
policy
response
social-model
is
a
paradigmatic
antidiscrimination,
disability.160
Hedonic damages doctrine that allows recovery on the basis of
the supposed intrinsic effect disability has on the enjoyment of life
implements and reinforces the individualistic theory that disability
rights advocates have persuasively argued against. The juridical
discourse in these cases treats disability as something located in the
individual rather than in society, something that in and of itself has
negative, often tragic, effects, and something that appropriately
triggers a form of charitable largesse. Although the psychological
evidence suggests that social factors are key contributors when people
with disabilities experience enduring hedonic harms,' 6' the current
doctrine preempts interest in those social factors. To the contrary, the

157. See Bagenstos, supra note 106, at 16-17.
158. Id. at 13-14; Bagenstos, supra note 121, at 427.
159. Bagenstos, supra note 121, at 430 (quoting MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 119 (1990)).

160. See id. at 433-36. This is not to say that the ADA entirely reflects the social model; in its
definition of disability in particular, it retains substantial aspects of the individualized medical
model. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Comparative Disability Employment Law from an American
Perspective, 24 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 649, 657-59 (2003).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
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lawyers' advice and cases discussed in Part I treat it as inevitable that
a disability makes it harder to enjoy life.
162
To illustrate the point, consider Nemmers v. United States,
one of the cases we cited in Part I. Nemmers was a federal case about
a boy who had been born with mental retardation and cerebral palsy
as a result of the defendants' negligent obstetric care; he was twelve
years old at the time of trial. 163 The district judge, Judge Michael
liable, but he summarily refused to award
Mihm, found the defendant
"quality of life" damages.1 64 The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Frank Easterbrook, vacated that ruling and remanded.165 Judge
Easterbrook analyzed the claim for "quality of life" damages by
focusing his attention on the plaintiffs introspective deficits.1 6 6 In a
striking example of the natural tendency to focus on one's own
perspective, Judge Easterbrook wrote that a "reduction in the ability
to appreciate one's own life, and to experience the lives of others
a
through books, is a real loss just as surely as pain and suffering16 is
7
real loss. Eric does not suffer pain, but he will never live greatly."
On remand, Judge Mihm developed at some length all of "the
normal things of life" that the plaintiffs evidence suggested he could
not do. 168 He noted that Eric could not speak well, "climb[] stairs or
walk[] on rough terrain," "hop or skip," "feed[] himself, car[e] for his
own personal hygiene, or dress ."' 169 Moreover, the plaintiff was
"antisocial and. . . prone to throwing fits both in private and in
public," although he "like[d] to swim and bowl, and he enjoys riding a
162. Nemmers v. United States, 612 F. Supp. 928 (C.D. Ill. 1985) (hereinafter Nemmers 1),
vacated, 795 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1986) (hereinafter Nemmers II), on remand, 681 F. Supp. 567
(C.D. Ill. 1988) (hereinafter Nemmers III), affld, 870 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1989).
163. Nemmers 1, 612 F. Supp. at 932.
164. See id. at 935.
165. See Nemmers II, 795 F.2d at 634.
166. Id.
167. Id. Judge Easterbrook's use of the phrase "live greatly" is a reference to a famous speech
by Justice Holmes, in which Holmes suggested that lawyers could live a life of the mind:
The law is the calling of thinkers. But to those who believe with me that not
the least godlike of man's activities is the large survey of causes, that to know
is no less than to feel, I say-and I say no longer with any doubt-that a man
may live greatly in the law as well as elsewhere; that there as well as
elsewhere his thought may find its unity in an infinite perspective; that there
as well as elsewhere he may wreak himself upon life, may drink the bitter
cup of heroism, may wear out his heart after the unattainable.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Profession of the Law (1886), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 29-30
(1921). See generally Francis A. Allen, Mr. Justice Holmes and "The Life of the Mind", 52 B.U. L.
REV. 229 (1972). Of course, Judge Easterbrook's statement also echoes Mill's comparison of a
satisfied pig and an unsatisfied person. See MILL, supra note 3, at 10.
168. Nemmers III, 681 F. Supp. at 575.
169. Id. at 572-73.
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bicycle." 170 The result, Judge Mihm found, was that the plaintiff "will
never have the sense of satisfaction, accomplishment, and enjoyment
that comes from reading a good book or walking alone in the woods,"
and "likewise will never experience the joy of marriage and creating a
family of his own." 17 1 Indeed, the judge said, "Eric will never be able to
date, parenting children,
do most of the normal things of life: the first 172
etc."
day,
the
of
politics
the
debating
reading,
Accordingly, Judge Mihm found an award of hedonic damages
to be appropriate. 173 He concluded that damages would benefit the
plaintiff, since he was "mentally conscious ('aware' to the extent that a
person with an I.Q. of 45 can be aware), and [was] capable of some
narrow capacity to enjoy life."1 74 In particular, an award of $400,000
"could provide him consolation and ease the burden of his condition by
making available to him 'things' that would occupy his attention and
make his life pass more easily." 175 Some of those "things," the judge
suggested, might include "a big screen television, or a special stereo
system, or a razzle dazzle birthday party (with a real magician pulling
176
rabbits out of a hat)."'
Nemmers is a perfect illustration of the medical/charitable
attitude that disability rights activists have mobilized against. We
have no doubt that Judge Mihm sincerely thought he was "doing the
right thing" by an unfortunate plaintiff. His motives were no doubt
those of humanity and decency. But his vision of disability was as a
trait that is located in and inherently limits the individual with a
disability. Although he discussed at length the activities the plaintiff
supposedly could not perform because of his disability, Judge Mihm
seems to have both underestimated the capacities of people with
mental retardation and treated those limitations as flowing naturally
from the disability, rather than contingently from social choices. We
don't know what Eric Nemmers has, in the nearly twenty years since
the final opinion in the case, proved capable of.1 77 What we do know is

170. Id. at 573.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 576.
173. Id. at 575 (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. Id. at 576.
175. Id. (citation omitted).
176. Id.
177. The underestimation of the potential of individuals with mental retardation is
widespread. Consider Nicholas Romeo, the plaintiff in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
Romeo had what the Court characterized as "profoundf" mental retardation, "with an I.Q.
between 8 and 10." Id. at 309. His own counsel had conceded, "in light of the severe character of
his retardation," that Romeo could never live outside of an institution. Id. at 317-18. Yet "ten
months after the Court's decision, Nicholas Romeo moved to a community residence in
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that the judge's description seems extreme. An I.Q. of 45 is usually
described as "moderate" retardation. 178 Of course, people in this
category are limited in their cognitive abilities in a number of ways.
But characteristically, they nevertheless can "learn self-care, social,
and vocational skills. Their language is functional and they can
achieve at least partial independence." 179 They frequently can learn to
read. People with mental retardation and cerebral palsy-including
80
people in the relevant I.Q. range-certainly can date, and marry.'
And the substantial self-advocacy movement among institutionalized
and formerly institutionalized people with mental retardation-who
have joined together in a national network of "People First"
organizations-shows that developmental disabilities hardly prevent
one from "debating the politics of the day."' 8 1 The ability of people
with mental retardation to be good parents has also been significantly
underestimated.1 8 2 But far from addressing the social choices and
stereotypes that were likely to turn the plaintiffs cognitive
impairment into profound limitations, the district court uncritically
endorsed those stereotypes and offered only an infantilizing form of
charity. Instead of substitute pleasures like "razzle dazzle birthday
parties," the ruling might have geared compensation towards
assistance with literacy, vocational training, independent living, and
parenting support. That, we contend, is the correct posture for courts
to take in the disability rights era.

Philadelphia." Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: The Move to Integration,
64 TEMP. L. REV. 393, 443 (1991). Eight years later, Cook observed that "[s]ince April 1983,
Romeo has been living, receiving services, and working part-time in his neighborhood." Id.
Nicholas Romeo's experience was typical of those released from Pennhurst, the institution where
he had been confined. See JAMES W. CONROY & VALERIE J. BRADLEY, THE PENNHURST
LONGITUDINAL STUDY: COMBINED REPORT OF FIVE YEARS OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 84, 118,

142 (1985) (discussing three separate case studies of Pennhurst residents and their
improvements in quality of life and ability after moving into community living arrangements
after Pennhurst's closing).
178. See MARTHA A. FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL RETARDATION: HAVING AND RAISING CHILDREN 32-33 (1999).
179. Id. at 32 (quoting ARC, PREVALENCE OF MENTAL RETARDATION (1982)).

180. See, e.g., Amy Dockser Marcus, Next Chapter: A Young Woman with DisabilitiesPlans
Her Wedding, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2005, at Al (discussing the story of Ms. Bergeron and her
engagement to another individual with Down syndrome).
181. See SHAPIRO, supra note 136, at 184-210.
182. See generally FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 178. Field and Sanchez cite numerous
studies on the subject, many of which included people in the same I.Q. range as Eric Nemmers.
Id. at 248-58.
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When lawyers ask for and courts make decisions like Nemmers,
they encourage feelings of pity toward people with disabilities. 8 3 They
also divert attention from society's contribution to the barriers that
deny opportunities to people with disabilities. Wendy Hensel has
argued that the acceptance of wrongful birth and wrongful life actions
(in which children with disabilities and their parents sue for the harm
of being born) reinforces the message that disability is "a status
inherent in the individual" and that the worth of a person with a
disability is "limited to the capability of current medical techniques to
identify and correct impairments."'1 4 At least for the participants, and
for whatever observers there are of the cases and the doctrine, a very
similar effect is likely here.
Awarding damages for the out-of-pocket costs of medical care,
rehabilitation, assistive technology, and personal assistance does not
send such a negative message, however. Those damages merely
recognize concrete obstacles to physical health and participation in the
community that money can overcome. Indeed, their very purpose is to
enable the disabled plaintiff to participate fully in the community. An
award of damages to compensate for the denial of opportunities would
also avoid the negative message of current damages practice.
Damages cannot directly dispel stigma or end discrimination, but can
fund accommodations as well as represent an acknowledgement that
the limitations people with disabilities face are not inherent in the
disability but rather are the consequence of society's reactions to
particular impairments. Awarding damages for the supposed hedonic
loss inherent in disability sends the opposite message, that disability,
in and of itself, makes one's life less happy, and that there is nothing
society can do but take pity on those who are disabled and throw some
charity their way.

183. Another example is Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 798 So.2d 374 (Miss. 2001).
There, the court stated that the plaintiffs closed-head injury "left him little more than a child,"
id. at 377, and upheld an award for hedonic damages in a discussion that was dripping with pity:
Perhaps most telling about the effects of the accident on Johnson's life is this
testimony from Johnson's daughter, Angela: "I watched an active man sit in a
wheelchair all day. I watched an articulate man who took pride in his
vocabulary struggle to get one word out. And I have watched a person that
was always happy look sullen and sad, stare out into space."
It is apparent that Johnson is no longer the person he was prior to the
accident. We hold today that these restrictions are significant enough to
warrant compensation as a separate and distinct element of damages.
Id. at 381 (paragraph numbering omitted).
184. Hensel, supra note 129, at 181.
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There is an additional reason to worry that awarding hedonic
damages for disability will actually harm the interests of people with
disabilities. A plaintiff may feel that standing up to the party who
wronged her, and recovering damages for that wrong, is empowering.
But the process of obtaining hedonic damages can undercut that sense
of empowerment.
To recover hedonic damages in a personal injury suit, a
plaintiff will often be called upon to testify that the injury has made
her life less enjoyable.1 8 5 But that very testimony is itself likely to be
debilitating. Such testimony, often derived from the initial adjustment
period during which disability typically does affect happiness, may
well reflect the plaintiffs true feelings about her life at the time of the
trial. But by focusing on the negative feelings that occur during that
period, plaintiffs with disabilities may delay or derail their ultimate
ability to adapt to their new condition; their testimony itself may
disrupt the hedonic adaptation process that ensures that most people's
happiness rebounds after a negative event.186
If nothing else, the drive to avoid cognitive dissonance can lead
a person who repeatedly testifies (even insincerely) about her lost
enjoyment of life to come to believe that testimony.'8 7 The view that
disability inherently limits enjoyment of life may therefore become a
self-fulfilling prophesy: The fact that non-disabled jurors predictably
fail to appreciate hedonic adaptation encourages injured plaintiffs
185. Plaintiffs' counsel may seek to minimize the importance of the plaintiffs testimony, see
BARTON, supra note 33 and accompanying text, but the cases cited in Part I.B. show that that
testimony remains important in practice.
186. Ellen S. Pryor, Noneconomic Damages, Suffering, and the Role of the Plaintiff's Lawyer,
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 563, 596 (2006) (citing studies showing that writing or talking about a
traumatic event may sometimes reduce experienced suffering and grief, but that other times it
will exacerbate the problem-particularly "when 'the rehearsals about an emotional experience
extend over a long period of time"' (quoting Bernard Rim6, Mental Rumination, Social Sharing,
and the Recovery from Emotional Exposure, in EMOTION, DISCLOSURE & HEALTH 280-81 (James
W. Pennebaker ed., 1995))); cf. Roger K. Pitman, Landy F. Sparr, Linda S. Saunders &
Alexander C. McFarlane, Legal Issues in PosttraumaticStress Disorder, in TRAUMATIC STRESS:
THE EFFECTS OF OVERWHELMING EXPERIENCE ON MIND, BODY, AND SOCIETY 378, 382 (Bessell A.
van der Kolk, Alexander C. McFarlane & Lars Weisaeth eds., 1996) ("Requiring the PTSD
patient to confront his or her traumatic history during interviews with attorneys and
consultants, depositions, and courtroom testimony thwarts characteristic efforts at avoidance
and predictably results in the resurgence of intrusive ideation and increased arousal.").
187. See Laura L. Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability Rights
Litigation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 247, 302-04 ("Repeatedly describing oneself as a victim may cause
one to come to believe that she is a victim."); see also Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40
UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1429 (1993) ('Victim talk can have a kind of self-fulfilling quality,
discouraging people who are victimized from developing their own strengths or working to resist
the limitations they encounter.").
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(guided by their counsel) to present evidence that disability has
limited their ability to enjoy life.188 "Remedies inevitably shape
wants,"18 9 and "the legal process itself inevitably will be an influence
on the plaintiffs 'noneconomic' losses. 19 °
Students of the Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI")
system have reported a parallel phenomenon. To receive benefits,
SSDI claimants must prove that their disabilities make them unable
to perform any "substantial gainful activity."' 91 The very effort to
prove that inability, however, gives SSDI applicants a powerful
psychic investment in the proposition that they cannot work. 192 One
commentator has accordingly concluded that "[t]he very process by
which disabled applicants become eligible for benefits leads to learned
states of helplessness."'19 3 And that is one of the key reasons why
virtually no one leaves the SSDI rolls-people convince themselves
that they cannot work, and their testimony in their benefits
applications becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy. 194 So too in the hedonic
damages context, a newly disabled person's extensive efforts to prove
that she can no longer enjoy life may give her a powerful psychic
investment in that proposition.
The phenomenon also finds parallels in wrongful birth and
wrongful life actions. Because such actions grant compensation "only
to those [people with disabilities] willing to openly disavow their selfworth and dignity," Hensel has argued that even individuals with
disabilities who succeed in their suits "are likely to feel abused and

188. Some of the testimony these plaintiffs have offered about their expectations of life seems
strikingly bleak given the limited extent of their disabilities. See, e.g., Varnell v. La. Tech. Univ.,
709 So. 2d 890, 896 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (discussing a plaintiff who had knee injury that required
two surgeries and who "testified that with her physical limitations and poor prognosis, she does
not see that she has 'much of a future' "); Overstreet v. Shoney's, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 717 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1999) (discussing a plaintiff whose left eye was injured, resulting in disfigurement and
loss of vision; she testified that "she will not risk going rafting, canoeing, or playing tennis," and
her husband testified that she "no longer wants to go out," that, "she bumps into people because
she doesn't see them coming on her left side," and that "she hates going to work because she
cannot tolerate the stress").
189. Abel, supra note 138, at 259.
190. Pryor, supra note 186, at 564.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2007).
192. See Richard V. Burkhauser, Lessons from the West German Approach to Disability
Policy, in DISABILITY AND WORK: INCENTIVES, RIGHTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 85, 85 (Carolyn L.
Weaver ed., 1991).
193. Cheryl Rogers, The Employment Dilemma for Disabled Persons, in IMAGES OF THE
DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 117, 122 (Alan Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987); see also Lucie E.
White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 555 (1987-1988) ("The [Social Security Act's] definition of disability
is in many ways a negation of self-empowerment.").
194. See Bagenstos, supra note 106, at 32, 64.
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diminished rather than empowered and vindicated." 195 And it is not
just the plaintiffs and their children who get the message that life
with a disability is not worth living. Other people with disabilities
196
hear the same message as well.
When courts declare that disability inherently limits the ability
to enjoy life, and thereby encourage plaintiffs with disabilities to
testify to that effect, they send a message that is difficult for people
with disabilities to ignore. True, people with disabilities who are not
plaintiffs may not come to believe the courts' view that disability does
in fact reduce the quality of their lives, and even plaintiffs whose
testimony seeking hedonic damages delays their adaptation may
ultimately make the adjustment. But judicial decisions affirming
hedonic damages for disability powerfully reinforce the notion that
society treats people with disabilities as inherently97 having lives of
lower quality (and perhaps importance) than others.1
Damages that compensate for the out-of-pocket costs of
rehabilitation, assistive technology, or personal assistance would not
cause these disempowering effects; they are in fact means to
empowerment. And damages that compensate for contraction of
opportunities are also empowering, because they represent an official
recognition that it is societal choices that exclude people with
disabilities, and that those choices are a wrong that the government
will address. 198 But hedonic damages for disability are as likely to
cause as to compensate for hedonic harm.

195. Hensel, supra note 129, at 171-72.
196. See id. at 174 ("Wrongful birth and life actions transmit a potentially powerful message
to all people with disabilities: as a matter of law, your impairment, standing alone, is a sufficient
basis upon which to evaluate the quality of your life."); see also Lori B. Andrews & Michelle
Hibbert, Courts and Wrongful Birth: Can Disability Itself Be Viewed as a Legal Wrong?, in
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND

INSTITUTIONS 318, 325 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000); Adrienne Asch,
Reproductive Technology and Disability, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990S 69, 94 (Sherrill

Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989) ("There is reason for us to fear wrongful birth suits and to
oppose suits for wrongful life: it is the message they send to the children themselves, disabled
people, and society about the worth of lives with impairments.").
197. See Adam A. Milani, Better off Dead Than Disabled? Should Courts Recognize a
'Wrongful Living" Cause of Action When Doctors Fail to Honor Patients'Advance Directives?, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 149, 217-20 (1997) (arguing that "wrongful living" actions have this impact
for similar reasons).
198. Cf. Bagenstos, supra note 121, at 472-73 (advocating, for similar reasons, an approach
to reading the ADA's "disability" definition that focuses on society's perceptions of disability
rather than anything "inherentf" in disability itself).
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D. Three Objections
To this point, we have argued that courts should not award
damages for the limitations disability supposedly imposes on the
ability to enjoy life. Such damages awards improperly individualize
the problems of disability. They focus attention on the person with a
disability and away from the social choices that attach disadvantage
to particular impairments. They may also demoralize people with
disabilities-both those individuals who must testify as plaintiffs that
disability does inherently limit their ability to enjoy life, and other
people with disabilities in the broader community who get the
message sent by these cases. Here we consider some possible
objections to our argument.
1. The Quiescence/Denial Objection
One might respond to our argument by accusing us of being too
supportive of adaptation. Denial, we all understand in our postFreudian world, is not psychologically healthy, and hedonic
adaptation makes people too accepting of the unjust actions and
conditions that have harmed them. Why, then should we encourage
adaptation? Shouldn't we, instead, encourage people to be angry at the
injustices that have been done to them?
There is, we think, a meaningful line between adaptation and
denial. The psychological evidence we discuss in Part II shows that
people adapt to disabling injuries and end up about as happy as they
were before they had those injuries. 199 They do so not by denying the
limitations their disabilities impose but by refusing to allow those
limitations to interfere with their happiness. 20 0 Nothing we say in this
Article is meant to suggest that people should engage in denial
regarding the limitations that disabilities impose. All we mean to say
is that those limitations are often far less significant than people
think, and that they need have no ultimate effect on happiness.
Nor do we think our proposal will lead to quiescence among
people who experience disabling injuries. We propose only to eliminate
a single category of damages for those injuries-not to get rid of tort
actions for those injuries entirely. To the extent that tort actions
provide
a vehicle for righteous
anger against corporate
irresponsibility, they will still do so under our proposal. Indeed,
because we would permit damages awards for denial of opportunities,

199. See supra notes 65-111 and accompanying text.
200. See Vash, supra note 82, at 152-53.
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our proposal would help direct the plaintiffs anger to the social
structures that are both the most significant contributors to the
unhappiness that people with disabilities feel and the major element
of the disadvantage that attaches to disability. 2 1 Our proposal would,
if anything, help to foster in people with disabilities "a taste for not
202
being discriminated against."
2. The Underdeterrence Objection (Of Ex Ante and Ex Post)
Those who believe tort law should provide appropriate
incentives to refrain from risky activities might raise a separate
objection. From such a deterrence perspective, one might wonder why
the legal system should take the adaptive preferences of people with
disabilities seriously at all: Even if every person with a disability
adapted to his or her condition hedonically, surely that does not mean
that, ex ante, potential defendants should be indifferent about
whether they cause disabling injuries. Awarding hedonic damages
based on a view that disability inherently limits life's enjoyment
might be thought to provide the necessary deterrent signal to
discourage acts that cause disabling injuries. 20 3 Deterrence is an ex
ante concept, so it may seem strange to use ex post valuations (those
of most people with disabilities) to measure damages in a system that
20 4
aims at deterrence.
It should not seem so strange, however. Among economic
analysts of tort law, who have developed the theory of deterrence most
extensively, it is a completely standard point that optimal ex ante
deterrence is best served by requiring injurers who are held liable to
pay the actual costs they have imposed-not the costs that might have
been expected ex ante. 20 5 The economics behind the point are simple:
"if a liable party must pay for the actual harm he causes, whatever the

201. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
202. Cf. Mary Anne Case, Developing a Taste for Not Being DiscriminatedAgainst, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 2273, 2273-80 (2003) (stating individuals with "a strong taste for not being discriminated
against" will alter their behavior, sometimes to their detriment).
203. McCaffrey, Kahneman & Spitzer, supra note 19, at 1397 ("Even if we believed that the
lower, ex post making whole value adequately compensated an injured plaintiff once an injury
had occurred, it does not follow that the damages faced by putative defendants, for purposes of
calibrating their ex ante incentives and expressing society's values, should also be set at this
making whole level.").
204. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority: A Reply, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 622, 622 (1985) ("[J]udges should be aware that their decisions create incentives influencing
conduct ex ante, and that attempts to divide the stakes fairly ex post will alter or reverse the
signals that are desirable from an ex ante perspective.").
205. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 236-37
(2004).
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level of harm happens to be, his expected damage payments will equal
20 6
the expected harm he causes."
In the case of hedonic damages for disabling injuries, the real
question is how to determine what is the "actual harm" caused by the
injury. Should the "actual harm" be measured by what the plaintiff
would have demanded as compensation for hedonic loss prior to the
injury (a large valuation, because most people expect that disabling
injuries will make them lose much enjoyment of life)? Or should it be
measured by what the plaintiff, after the injury, would pay to be
"made whole" for hedonic loss (a smaller valuation, because most
people do not find that disabilities cause them to lose much enjoyment
of life)? As McCaffery, Kahneman, and Spitzer have persuasively
shown, either the selling-price or the making-whole perspective could
plausibly be understood as describing the "actual harm" caused by an
injury; which perspective to incorporate is essentially a policy question
that might have different answers for different activities, torts, and
207
damages.
The argument for using the (ex ante) selling-price perspective
to describe the hedonic harm of a disabling injury would rest on nondisabled people's dread of experiencing such an injury, and the degree
to which disability limits choices among activities, even if it does not
limit felt happiness. But tort law can account for much of the dread
(and perhaps choice-limitation) attendant to disability without
awarding hedonic damages. Under our proposal, courts would award
damages for medical expenses, lost opportunities, and physical pain,
among other things, and those damages would likely capture much of
what non-disabled people fear about disability.
We do not, however, believe there is any independent value in
the law protecting and endorsing non-disabled people's dread of
disability. As a normative matter, disability is best understood as a
trauma, not a tragedy. Damages awards should reflect that
20 8
understanding.

206. Id. at 236.
207. McCaffery, Kahneman & Spitzer, supra note 19, at 1397-1403.
208. In any event, it is doubtful that tort liability could meaningfully reduce non-disabled
people's dread of becoming disabled. So long as a few salient examples of disabling injuries
remain, the fears will remain as well. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 711-15 (1998) (discussing the importance of
the availability heuristic in public perceptions of risk).
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3. The Undercompensation Objection

One might also respond that our proposal will lead to undercompensation. Even if many people with disabilities find that their
disabilities do not limit their ability to enjoy life, not all do. For those
who do authentically experience a loss of enjoyment of life, our
proposal appears to deny full compensation.
Imagine, in this regard, an exceptionally talented amateur
pianist. If an accident severs her hands, she will no longer be able to
engage in an activity-producing beautiful music-that brought her
transcendent joy. Even if she finds substitute pleasures, most people
with exceptional talents in one area are not equally talented in others.
It seems intuitively obvious that by losing her hands, the pianist has
lost something uniquely pleasurable, yet our proposal would deny her
compensation for that lost pleasure. 20 9 One might therefore argue that
our proposal is too blunt: People who do not experience hedonic harm
from their disabilities should not recover hedonic damages, but people
who do experience such harm should. Why shouldn't appropriate jury
instructions and adversary presentation of evidence solve the
problems we have identified above?
We can offer a couple of responses to the undercompensation
objection. It bears emphasis again that we do not propose to leave
disabling injuries uncompensated. To the contrary, under our proposal
courts would award damages for medical expenses, rehabilitation
counseling, assistive technology, and personal assistance, as well as
for the economic costs of society's restriction of opportunities to people
with disabilities. (It is worth recalling that social factors like those for
which our proposal would compensate are the most important
contributors to the hedonic loss experienced by those people with
disabilities who experience hedonic loss. 210 ) Under current law, courts
do not typically award some of these forms of damages for disabling
injuries. Our argument therefore is not that courts currently award
too much in damages for disabling injuries (indeed, they may award
too little) but that they award the wrong damages. Under our
proposal, total compensation for disabling injuries-and thus the

209. Beyond examples like this, a person whose hands are cut off may simply be restricted in
her choice of pleasure-creating activities, even if she ultimately enjoys life to the same extent
that she did before. That type of loss might be dealt with under the rubric of disability or
permanent impairment damages rather than hedonic damages. To the extent that our argument
applies to those damages, see supra note 23 and accompanying text, one might make a similar
undercompensation challenge to it.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
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aggregate deterrent signal against actions that cause disabling
injuries-might be as large as or even larger than under current law
It is certainly true that our proposal would deny compensation
for hedonic harm even to those plaintiffs who phenomenologically
experience that harm. But a more narrowly tailored proposal that
relied on jury instructions and adversarial presentation of testimony
to sort out the cases in which the plaintiff "truly" experienced hedonic
harm would not, we believe, solve the problems we have identified. In
part, this is due to the problem of cognitive bias. When people hear
information that is inconsistent with their preexisting biases, they
often do not reconsider; instead, they process the apparently
2 11
inconsistent information in a way that confirms those biases.
The Schindler case, in which an escalator amputated the
plaintiffs toes, 212 is a perfect example of the phenomenon. The jurors
and appellate judges believed so strongly that even a minor disability
just had to lead to unhappiness that they disregarded all of the
evidence that the plaintiff was happy. Sure, he thinks he's happy now,
they apparently felt, but we know he'll be unhappy when he gets older
and can't play varsity football. The Schindler case, viewed against the
backdrop of general psychological findings regarding cognitive bias,
suggests that so long as courts award hedonic damages for disabling
injuries, lawyers, judges, and jurors will apply a view of disability as
trage.dy-even in the face of testimony that the plaintiff does not see
2 13
her disability that way.
Nor is it readily possible to award hedonic damages for
"unique" or "transcendent" losses (like that experienced by a talented
amateur pianist) while denying those damages for the loss of more
"mundane" activities (like gardening). Prior to adaptation, one's
pleasures may be bound up in any sort of activity-"unique" or
"mundane"-and happiness can equally adopt to the loss of any sort of
activity. There is therefore no basis in principle for distinguishing
among lost activities in this way, and there will be great difficulty
doing so in practice. If our concerns are correct, the proper response
211. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1208
(1995) (explaining, in the context of stereotyping, that individuals group others into categories
that fit their pre-defined expectancies, and "once a target individual has been perceived as a
member of a particular category, people are more likely to remember the target as exhibiting
attributes and behaviors commonly associated with that category.").
212. See supra text accompanying notes 50-62.
213. Should a "debiasing" approach, which would seek to eliminate the biases we discuss
here, emerge in this context, it would certainly warrant consideration as a way of avoiding the
bluntness of our proposal. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, DebiasingThrough Law, 35 J.
LEGAL STUD. 199, 200-01 (2006).
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appears to be the categorical one of eliminating hedonic damages for
disabling injuries entirely.
To be sure, this means that some people who experience
hedonic loss will not receive compensation for that loss (though they
will for other aspects of their injuries). But modern tort law includes
many doctrines rendering real harms non-compensable. For starters,
in some (though by no means all) situations in which a victim is no
longer able to receive compensation, modern tort doctrine sacrifices
deterrent goals. Thus wrongful death statutes offer only very limited
damages; 2 14 pain and suffering damages in some jurisdictions do not
survive the death of the plaintiff; 215 and many jurisdictions do not
allow any recovery for lost enjoyment of life in either wrongful death
actions or where the plaintiff is unconscious of the loss. 2 16 As Rick
Abel has argued, "If tort law excludes significant damages because
victims cannot be compensated, then arguments for general damages
grounded in corrective or distributive justice lose some of their
force."

217

Even where injured persons can receive compensation, it is
simply not the case that the law generally awards or should award
damages for all injuries caused by a wrongful injury. To the contrary,
as Robert Rabin has persuasively argued, "fidelity to the goals of tort
law, and more particularly to the compensation objectives of accident
law, does not require efforts to engage in precisely contoured case-bycase implementation of a make-whole principle." 21 8 One familiar
example, made prominent by Judge Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long

214. For a list of wrongful death statutes for all fifty states, see Andrew J. McClurg, Dead
Sorrow: A Story About Loss and a New Theory of Wrongful Death Damages, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1,

23-26 nn.129-31 (2005). The statutes allow only limited liability; at common law, the rule was
against any liability at all. Id. at 18-20; see also Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death,
17 STAN. L. REV. 1043, 1067-76 (1965).
215. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.34 (West 2007) ("In an action or proceeding by a

decedent's personal representative or successor in interest on the decedent's cause of action, the
damages recoverable are limited to the loss or damage that the decedent sustained or incurred
before death, including any penalties or punitive or exemplary damages that the decedent would
have been entitled to recover had the decedent lived, and do not include damages for pain,
suffering, or disfigurement.").
216. See Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Hailey, 822 So. 2d 911, 931 n.6 (Miss. 2000) (en banc)
(Cobb, J., dissenting) (citing cases from twenty states); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-69 (West 2003)
(overruling Choctaw Maid Farm).
217. Abel, supra note 138, at 270.
218. Robert L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on Recovery for
Intangible Loss, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 375 (2006); see also John C.P. Goldberg, Two
Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 466-67 (2006)

(arguing for a theory of "fair" rather than "full" compensation, under which "a fact-finder might
be entitled to award less-than-fully compensatory damages, even to a not-at-fault tort plaintiff').
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Island R.R., 219 is often labeled the "duty" rule; it holds that no
damages are available for physical injuries caused by the defendant's
negligence, if the defendant's conduct was foreseeably risky, ex ante,
only with respect to someone other than the plaintiff. 220
Another limited liability doctrine perhaps more closely related
to the topic of this article governs negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Common law courts generally do not award damages for
emotional distress incurred when the plaintiff witnesses someone
else's physical injury or narrowly avoids such injury herself, unless
the plaintiff herself was in the "zone of danger" in which she was at
risk of sustaining such an injury.22 1 Other similar policy judgments
abound: While damages are available for the emotional toll wrought
by the wrongful death of a spouse or minor child, in many states there
is no authorized emotional distress recovery for wrongful death of an
adult son or daughter, or of the parent of an adult plaintiff, or of a
sibling or dear friend. 222 These rules do not reflect a belief that people
who are outside of the zone of danger or whose adult children are
wrongfully killed never in fact experience emotional distress; nor do
they reflect a belief that such emotional distress is not in fact an
injury. Instead, they rest on a policy judgment that awarding
emotional distress damages in the specified circumstances would
create uncertain, and potentially limitless, liability, and, perhaps, that
it would unhelpfully encourage would-be claimants to dwell on their
223
traumas.
Our argument, too, rests on a policy judgment, though one of a
different and perhaps even more defensible kind. Even if some
individuals who experience disabling injuries honestly find that their
conditions inherently limit their enjoyment of life, we believe that
awarding damages on that basis is on balance harmful to people with
219. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
220. See, e.g., Bryant v. Glastetter, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 292 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (denying
recovery to plaintiff tow truck operator killed after being summoned by police to haul away
defendant drunk driver's car, notwithstanding the defendant's negligence with respect to earlier
users of the road).
221. See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963) (applying the "zone
of danger" rule). Compare Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 924-25 (Cal. 1968) (overruling Amaya
and allowing recovery for emotional trauma caused when mother witnessed the death of her
child as a result of defendant motorist's negligence) with Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423
(N.Y. 1969) (refusing to allow recovery in similar circumstances).
222. See, e.g., Stewart v. Price, 718 So. 2d 205, 209-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (discussing
evolution of Florida statutory law on this point); Weimer v. Wolf, 641 So. 2d 480, 480-81 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (same).
223. Cf. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625,
1679-82 (2002) (stating that courts may limit emotional distress liability to force a plaintiff to get
on with his or her life).
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disabilities-even
those
people
with
disabilities
who
phenomenologically experience hedonic loss. If, for example, damages
for negligent infliction of emotional distress can be limited out of a
concern for fairness to people who negligently cause harm, surely
damages for disabling injuries can be limited out of concern for people
with disabilities themselves.
E. Of Paternalism
At this point, it is worthwhile to consider the relationship
between our argument and the anti-paternalist position articulated by
most disability rights activists. As we suggested above, 224 paternalism
has historically been one of the most significant contributors to the
disadvantage people with disabilities experience. Non-disabled
parents, teachers, doctors, rehabilitation counselors, employers, and
others have arrogated to themselves the prerogative to decide what is
best for people with disabilities. 225 In so doing, they have deprived
people with disabilities of opportunities to work and participate in the
community. 226 They have denied people with disabilities the autonomy
that consists in making one's own choices. And they have denied
people with disabilities the "dignity of risk"-"the opportunity to
develop their skills, test them in the world, and succeed or fail
according to their talents."227 Anti-paternalism thus has become one of
tha core tenets on which most disability rights advocates agree. 228
Our argument in this paper certainly draws on the disability
rights critique of paternalism. Against the historical backdrop of
paternalistic control over people with disabilities, the judicial practice
of awarding damages based on the hedonic harms supposedly inherent
in disability appears as yet another instance of people without
disabilities telling people with disabilities how they should feel. Most
people with disabilities do not feel that their conditions limit their
ability to enjoy life. But people without disabilities tend not to see it
224. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
225. For a discussion of the role of paternalism in disability oppression, see JAMES I.
CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT Us: DISABILITY OPPRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT 52-55

(1998).
226. For an example, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76-77 (2002). For
criticism of the Court's decision in Echazabal, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, The
Americans with Disabilities Act, and Rational Discrimination, 55 ALA. L. REV. 923, 930-34
(2004).
227. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 921, 997 (2003).
228. See id. at 1010-12 (discussing how individuals with disabilities were moved to action by
their desire to "escape the control of professionals who thought they knew what was best [for the
disabled individuals]"); Bagenstos, supra note 226, at 932 n.70.
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that way. To embrace the view that disability really lessens the
enjoyment of life seems once again to substitute the non-disabled
public's view of disability for that of most people with disabilities.
Yet the matter is complicated, in a way that underscores the
analytical and normative limitations of a purely anti-paternalist
position. At least some people with disabilities-including,
presumably, many plaintiffs who are prepared to testify about their
unhappiness-hold what we have been calling the "non-disabled
view"-that disability does limit their ability to enjoy life. Under our
proposal, those individuals would not be able to recover damages for
their sincerely felt hedonic losses. To that extent, as the discussion in
the previous section highlights, our position itself could reasonably be
described as paternalist. We can at least partially defend ourselves on
the ground that when people with disabilities believe they are less
able to enjoy life, those beliefs are artifacts of the adjustment period or
are endogenous to a society that believes disability inherently limits
life's enjoyment and a legal system that encourages people with
disabilities to testify that it does. 229 But then we must confess to
making a move that resembles the very conduct and attitudes we
criticize, that writes off the positive hedonic experiences of most
people with disabilities. Our proposal is therefore paternalistic in
230
many individual cases.
Still, the kind of paternalism to which we have confessed is
categorically different from the kind of paternalism criticized by the
disability rights movement. When disability rights activists object to
paternalism, they are not simply challenging decisions to override the
choices of particular individuals with disabilities. They are more
importantly challenging a system in which the views of most people
with disabilities-that disability is a trauma, not a tragedy, and that
its disadvantages are largely socially created-are written off as
irrational and illegitimate. 231 In that respect, our position is very
much in line with the "anti-paternalist" view espoused by disability
rights activists. In the end, our argument must rest on the
consequences of using the adaptive preferences of most people with
disabilities as the basis for damages law: Using those preferences
avoids demoralization and puts the focus where it should be-on
integrating people with disabilities into society, rather than pitying
them for being outside of it.
229. See supratext accompanying notes 185-98.
230. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 19, at 1171-90 (discussing the inevitability of
paternalism and noting that "the anti-paternalist position is incoherent, simply because there is
no way to avoid effects on behavior and choices.").
231. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 136, at 12-40.
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CONCLUSION

We have argued that courts should not award hedonic damages
for disabling injuries. Most people with disabilities find that their
conditions do not limit their ability to enjoy life, though most people
without disabilities do not believe them. Incorporating the views of
people without disabilities in the law distracts attention from the
social choices that attach disadvantage to disability, and it may itself
inflict hedonic harm on people with disabilities.
Our discussion has implications that extend well beyond the
disability or hedonic damages contexts, however. For one thing, our
discussion illustrates that tort remedies must be judged not just on
how much they give victorious plaintiffs but on whether the
procedures by which they are awarded are empowering or
disempowering. Hedonic damages may increase plaintiffs' recovery for
disabling injuries (though our proposed system might well award as
much or more), but they have negative effects on the class of people
with disabilities that must be taken into account as well. The same
may well be true of other tort remedies.
We have also highlighted an underappreciated complexity in
the theory of adaptive preferences. Adherents to that theory often
write as if identifying a preference as adaptive is dispositive of the
question whether that preference is a proper measure of justice or
guide to policy. As we have shown, matters are more complicated than
that. Identifying a preference as adaptive should be the beginning, not
the end, of the normative inquiry. Often, it will make sense to
disregard adaptive preferences. But the example of hedonic damages
and disability shows that, at least sometimes, it is more just, and
makes better policy, to take adaptive preferences seriously.

